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Deregulation Defanged: An Empirical Review of
Federal Deregulatory Policy and its Legal Obstacles
Jack Thorlin*
^Äëíê~Åí=
The federal government has embarked on a major deregulatory
push since 2017, but summarizing its effects has proven difficult.
Federal agencies issue cost-benefit analyses of specific deregulatory
actions, but courts have struck down several of the proposed rule
changes, and state governments have taken countervailing action
against others. To obtain a clear understanding of the overall effectiveness of the Trump administration’s deregulatory efforts, this article provides a rigorous, empirical review of deregulatory actions taken and the countervailing effect of judicial actions and state
governments.
Methodological problems have plagued estimates of overall
Trump administration regulatory savings, most of which have come
from right-leaning sources in and out of government. The White
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for example, releases the authoritative federal accounting of deregulatory savings.
However, its approach is overly simplistic, includes rules that are deregulatory in only a technical sense, and examines only the present
value of anticipated future savings. Examining only present value assumes that all future expected regulatory savings will materialize, an
assumption that requires no intervention by the judiciary or state
governments. As we will see, this assumption is unwarranted.
Through this accounting approach, OMB has claimed $23 billion in
overall savings from deregulation over an indefinite time horizon,
amounting to $1.6 billion annually, but a closer review finds only
around $131 to $261 million in actual annual savings through the end
of fiscal year 2018. An empirical examination of less tangible “soft”
benefits of deregulation—e.g., the decreased expectation of future
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regulation by businesses—yields no clear evidence of deregulatory effect beyond the savings identified in specific deregulatory actions.
Anticipated actions by courts and the governments of proregulation states against upcoming or ongoing major deregulatory actions suggest the bottom line of federal deregulatory savings estimates will not change dramatically in the near future. The totality of
the evidence thus suggests the administration’s deregulatory efforts
have not and will not meaningfully alter the country’s economic
growth. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that the
Trump administration’s deregulatory campaign has been ineffective
and is unlikely to improve.

fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
The Trump administration and Republican leaders in Congress
frequently cite deregulation as a major cause of the current period of
economic growth.1 However, there has been almost no serious general accounting of deregulation under the Trump administration.
That is largely due to regulatory cost being a complex and highly
partisan issue. Right-leaning think tanks have put forward triumphalist estimates with little credibility, while academics have generally focused critiques more on specific deregulatory actions than on overall
regulatory burden reduction.2 Neither vague triumphalist estimates
nor analyses of specific regulations truly address the salient question:
is the deregulatory agenda significantly driving economic growth?
This article contributes to answering that question with a rigorous
empirical approach to assessing (a) projected savings from deregulatory actions and (b) the effect of judicial and state-level interventions
that have weakened federal deregulatory action.
1. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 2, 2019, 9:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1123987855053873154 (“Tax Cuts [] and deregulation [] have produced non-inflationary prosperity for all Americans.”).
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harrington, Report: Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in
Regulatory Savings, WASH. FREE BEACON (April 20, 2017), https://freebeacon.com/issues/
report-trump-rolls-back-60-billion-regulatory-savings/ (citing the think tank American Action
Forum for the proposition that the Trump administration has saved “an additional $60 billion
in regulatory costs” within the first three months of the administration despite OMB itself
claiming $23 billion by the end of fiscal year 2018 over an indefinite time horizon). For a general, qualitative assessment of Trump administration regulatory savings, see Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride: Business Deregulation in the Trump Era, 70 MERCER L.
REV. 587 (2019) (describing the landscape of regulatory change under President Trump from a
more qualitative and less empirical vantage).
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Understanding the change in overall regulatory costs first requires an examination of where overall regulatory costs were at the
beginning of the Trump administration. Both the administration and
the Trump campaign cited studies placing the annual federal regulatory burden—the total economic cost of complying with federal
regulations—at about $2 trillion.3 The campaign claimed it would reduce the regulatory burden by $200 billion annually.4 The administration has publicly announced $23 billion in total future savings
from the deregulatory actions taken to date, which translates to about
$1.6 billion in annual savings.5 Needless to say, $1.6 billion is a negligible dent in $2 trillion, a reduction slightly less than a tenth of one
percent. However, on March 19, 2019, the White House announced:
“The Trump administration has rolled back business killing regulations to unleash an economic boom across all sectors of the economy.”6 Either something more must be at work than the specific savings cited, or the administration is dramatically overstating the effect
of deregulation.
There are several potential explanations for the administration’s
apparently misplaced enthusiasm. The regulatory burden might not
actually be as high as $2 trillion, so even if the Trump administration
is cutting a significant portion of the burden, it does not amount to
large savings. Alternatively, the Trump administration might be undercounting deregulatory savings. After all, its estimates include only
the specific federal estimates for savings from the repeal of particular
rules. It is entirely possible that the decreased expectation of future
regulation among the business community accounts for much higher
savings than the repeal of a few specific rules.

3. Peter Navarro, Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory & Energy
Policy Impacts, at 6 (Sept. 29, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Trump_Economic

_Plan.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Alan Levin and Alyza Sebenius, Trump Claims $1.6 Billion a Year Saved from Cutting Red Tape, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201810-17/trump-administration-claims-23-billion-in-regulation-savings.
6. Press Release, White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Economic Agenda is
Working for All Americans,” (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-economic-agenda-working-americans/. Adding to the
confusion, the White House stated, “The Trump Administration’s regulatory reform efforts
have saved American families and businesses $23 billion in Fiscal Year 2018.” Levin & Sebenius, supra note 5.

335

_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï

[Vol. 34

To resolve the apparent paradox, we must take a closer look at
various estimates for overall regulatory burden and Trump administration deregulatory actions. At the level of overall regulatory burden, two general methods for calculating regulatory costs produce
wildly varying estimates: (1) tallying the specific costs of individual
rules, and (2) using survey or econometric tools to produce an estimate of the overall regulatory burden. The first approach is more
grounded in specific measurable economic facts, but omits entirely
the more difficult-to-quantify benefits of deregulation, notably the
reduced expectation of future regulation and the avoided costs of discontinued regulatory efforts that did not culminate in actual rulemakings. The second approach can capture those harder-to-quantify
benefits. However, the difficulty of isolating deregulatory effects necessitates using statistical methods that are prone to misuse or abuse
by partisan entities. Bluntly, the organizations that have used the second approach often appear to have done so in order to reach their
own preferred conclusion on regulatory costs.7
Similar methodological problems have plagued estimates of the
Trump administration’s regulatory savings. Partisan entities have
used inconsistent or nonsensical methods to come up with extreme
estimates that are then passed on by friendly media outlets without
necessary caveats.8 The federal government itself issues tallies of the
economic impact of individual new regulations that are more reliable
than broad estimates, yet the federal tallies can be simultaneously
over- and underinclusive. They do not include savings from decreased expectations of regulation, and are thus underinclusive. However, because of imprecise definitions of “deregulation,” the formal
tallies can also count actions that do not fit a classical understanding
of the term. Some ostensibly “deregulatory” actions taken by the administration were either initiated by the Obama administration or are
deregulatory only in a technical sense, such as rules relaxing eligibility for special Medicare reimbursement rates.9
7. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of All Cost
of Regulation Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway (Jan. 8, 2017) (Competitive

Enterprise Inst., Working Paper, 2017) h ttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2502883 (exhibiting a clear anti-regulation bias while using dubious statistical methods to reach an outlier conclusion regarding the total cost of federal regulations).
8. See infra, Section I(C)(ii).
9. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 414 (Nov. 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR2017-11-16/2017-24067.
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To obtain a neutral, non-partisan estimate for overall savings, in
this article I examine “hard” deregulatory benefits—the federal agencies’ savings estimates for specific deregulatory actions—and “soft”
benefits that accrue from decreased private sector expectation of regulation. Establishing “hard” benefits simply requires a review of
OMB’s estimate, screening out rules that do not reasonably fit the
definition of “deregulation” because they control access to federal
subsidies rather than govern the behavior of private sector entities.
This analysis suggests $131 to $261 million in annual savings as of
the end of fiscal year 2018, with highly uncertain future additions
possible as additional major deregulatory acts are finalized and make
their way through legal challenges. While establishing a precise estimate for “soft” benefits is essentially impossible, I review the available evidence for soft benefits and the factors that are likely weakening
these types of benefits. I conclude that there is no evidence for significant “soft” benefits.
This suggests that the Trump administration’s deregulatory
agenda is not having a significant effect on the economy as a whole.
Even taking the maximum “hard” deregulatory savings estimate,
$261 million annually is roughly one-thousandth of one percent of
current U.S. GDP.10 It is about one-tenth of the unrecoverable cost
of the partial government shutdown of December 2018 – January
2019.11 However, the ubiquity of the deregulatory talking point
among right-wing politicians and commentators suggests the deregulatory agenda serves important non-economic ends. Among the explanations I explore are the unification of the Republican Party and
gratifying politically important constituencies.
In Part I, I describe and evaluate various existing empirical
measures for the overall regulatory burden and deregulatory actions
taken to date under President Trump. Using insight gained from the
review of existing literature, in Part II, I present my neutral estimates
for “hard” and “soft” deregulatory benefits, factoring in empirical data on judicial review of agency actions and state government inter10. Interactive Access to Industry Economic Accounts Data: GDP by Industry, U.S.
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Jan. 9, 2020), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?
ReqID=51&step=1.
11. Caitlin Emma & Jennifer Scholtes, Shutdown Costs the U.S. 3 Billion That Won’t
Be Recovered, CBO says, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/
2019/01/28/government-shutdown-cost-1123735.
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ventions. In Part III, I discuss possible non-economic motives for the
deregulatory agenda which may explain the contradiction between
the amount of discussion of deregulation and its apparently small
economic effect.

fK==b ufpqfkd= b jmfof`^i= b pqfj^qbp=lc=qeb= o bdri^qlov=
_ roabk=^ka= m obpfabkq= qorjm Û p= a bobdri^qlov= ^ dbka^ =
The first step of the investigation into the economic effect of
President Trump’s deregulatory agenda is reviewing existing studies
of the overall regulatory burden and the economic effect of recent
deregulatory actions. Recent studies place the overall federal regulatory burden—the cost of complying with federal regulations—within
a range of $78 billion to $2.028 trillion annually.12 Estimates for
Trump administration regulatory savings range from $1.6 billion annually (the administration’s estimate) to perhaps as much as $86 billion in the administration’s first year (the estimate of one rightleaning think tank, as relayed by conservative media sources).13 The
absurdly broad sweep of these ranges strongly suggests the need for a
new approach. Examining the apparent flaws in the studies produced
to date should help us craft a better methodology.

A. Why are Regulatory Costs So Hard to Pin Down?
Empirical measurement of regulatory costs is inherently subjective and difficult to specify in a neutral fashion. Even coming up with
a definition for regulatory cost can be surprisingly challenging. It is
simple to say that “regulatory costs” are the total cost to the government of enforcing a rule and to private entities of following it, but the
lines get blurry at the level of federal regulations. Should we count
12. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT, at 2 (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf [hereinafter 2017 DRAFT
REPORT] (estimating $78 billion annually as the low end of the regulatory burden range); see
also Mark Crain & Nicole Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS (Sept. 10, 2014),
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20150323014159/https://www.nam.org/data-and-repo
rts/cost-of-federal-regulations/federal-regulation-full-study.pdf (estimating $2.028 trillion as
the annual regulatory burden).
13. Tim Devaney, Study: Trump Has Eliminated $86B in Regs, THE HILL (Apr. 20,
2017), https://thehill.com/regulation/329720-study-trump-has-eliminated-86b-in-regs.
THE
THE
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the costs of “self-regulation,” where expensive measures might be
adopted by businesses to forestall regulation by a government entity?
How do we count the decreased expectation of future costs due to a
general presumption against new regulation in a particular administration?

1. Deepwater Horizon: a window into empirical problems with
regulatory costs
One recent example helps illustrate the definitional problems. In
the aftermath of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP, the oil
conglomerate that operated the compromised oil rig, spent $17.7 billion on response activities, and invested more in its internal independent safety and operational risk management group.14 BP presented those actions as voluntary, just part of being a good corporate
citizen. However, the Obama administration also put in place regulations such as the Well Control Rule, finalized in April 2016.15 It
placed specific requirements on the operation of blowout preventers,
the safety valve that failed on the Deepwater Horizon rig.16 The
Trump administration quickly proposed a partial repeal of that rule,
claiming that the change would save the offshore oil industry $946
million over ten years.17
If one were keeping a table comparing regulatory costs between
the two administrations, how would one apportion costs? Though
neither administration included the cost of BP’s voluntary measures
in its regulatory cost estimates, the $17.7 billion BP spent on remedial activities is, in some sense, a regulatory cost. Had BP not made
those efforts, a federal regulator or a court would likely have forced
them to do something. If the expenditures were made pursuant to a
court order, it would seem strange to put those costs on the Obama
14. Sustainability Review, BP, at 7, 16 (2010), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bpcountry/en_ru/documents/publications_PDF_eng/bp_sustainability_review_2010_eng.pdf.
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160420152154/].
15. Wendy Becktold, Proposed Changes to Safety Rule Suggest Influence of Offshore
Drilling Industry, SIERRA CLUB (May 14, 2018), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/proposedchanges-key-safety-rule-Well-Control-Rule-suggest-influence-offshore-drilling-industry.
16. Id.
17. U.S. BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, INTERIOR, OIL AND GAS
AND SULFUR OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF—BLOWOUT PREVENTER
SYSTEMS AND WELL CONTROL REVISIONS, 92 Fed. Reg. 22128 (May 2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05-11/pdf/2018-09305.pdf.
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administration, which had no oversight over the courts. However, it
is probably true on some level that the Obama administration was
more likely to strictly regulate BP, which likely spurred BP to make
additional expenditures. The tallying of those costs within the
Obama administration would then require a number of complicated
allowances.
The simplest way to tally the costs is the way the administrations
actually did estimate the costs, counting only the estimated cost of
compliance with new federal regulations at the time those rules were
adopted. When the Obama administration finalized the rule, it estimated the cost would be $858 million to $1 billion over ten years.18
Through deregulation of part of the Well Control rule, the Trump
administration projects a decrease in costs of $946 million over ten
years.19
That methodology is clean but does not at all describe the actual
economic effect of the regulation. The Obama administration clearly
did not impose $946 million in actual costs, especially since the rule
was only in place starting in April 2016 with seven months to go in
the Obama presidency. It certainly intended to impose those costs,
but the actual economic effect was far less. President Trump also did
not repeal the entire rule, so some portion of the regulatory costs will
continue with his administration’s implicit blessing. Should his administration then be on the hook for those costs? For how long? The
duration of a presidency? If we use that measure, then the Trump
administration’s imposed costs could easily exceed the Obama administration’s even for a rule imposed by the Obama administration that
the Trump administration successfully repealed. But if duration of a
presidency is not appropriate, what is? Ten years? Forever?

2. Requirements for useful methodology
We are left with an unpalatable reality: assigning cost responsibility for regulations is fundamentally an exercise in arbitrariness. But
that does not mean that all assessments are created equal. Rather, an
assessment of regulatory cost is only worthwhile if it is (a) uniform in
methodology between administrations, (b) presented and discussed

18.
19.
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consistent with the methodology, and (c) not deliberately chosen to
reach a desired conclusion.
Consistent methodology is easy to explain, yet surprisingly rare in
practice. Comparing finalized actions for the Obama administration
and proposed actions for Trump would be misleading.20 Similarly, relying on survey data from small businesses to estimate Obama-era
regulatory costs is not comparable to using agency-estimated regulatory costs for the Trump administration.
When one examines general regulatory cost studies, the presentation and discussion of regulatory cost estimates almost never corresponds to the study’s methodology. Imagine, for example, that a regulation proposed in 2016 is expected to cost $10 billion over ten
years. A think tank issues a report at the end of 2016 claiming that
the administration has imposed $10 billion in new regulatory costs in
2016. A new administration comes into office in 2017 and rescinds
the regulation. The same think tank says that the new administration
saved $10 billion. The actual truth of the underlying matter is that no
new costs were imposed by the previous administration and no costs
were avoided—the rule never went into effect. The presentation conflated actual costs with projected costs.
Self-serving methodologies pervade the arena of regulatory estimates. The most obvious example of this is comparing the final year
of an administration with the first year of a new administration.21 A
new administration will not have time to finalize any major regulatory or deregulatory actions within one year. An outgoing administration will have had eight years to propose regulations and ordinarily
will not propose a major new regulation in its final year. Thus, in its
final year, it will be mostly finalizing regulations, precisely what a
20. See, e.g., Diane Katz, Here’s How Much Red Tape Trump Has Cut, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/
heres-how-much-red-tape-trump-has-cut. The study claims President Obama put rules in place
costing $122 billion annually, while President Trump saved $23 billion in 2018 alone. The citation for the Trump numbers leads to an OIRA publication, which does not explain where the
overall numbers come from other than to cite to a list of deregulatory actions. Many of those
actions are proposed rulemakings, not finalized rules. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, REGULATORY REFORM REPORT: COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
(2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_Actions_for_ Fiscal_Year_2018.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, So, What Regulations Did Trump Eliminate?,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://cei.org/blog/so-what-regulationsdid-trump-eliminate.
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new administration will not be doing. If one wanted to maximize
costs of the previous administration and minimize costs of the new,
all it would take would be to put on methodological blinders and look
at finalized regulations.

B. Overall Regulatory Burden
To produce an estimate of Trump-specific regulatory cost reductions, it is helpful to first understand the overall regulatory burden.
Conceptually, this is the cost to the country as a whole of complying
with every rule established or policed by a federal agency—the combined costs to the federal government of implementing the rule and
to the private sector of complying with the rule. The overall burden
produces a logical cap on the amount of savings we could reasonably
attribute to President Trump. If the overall burden is $78 billion annually—a low-end estimate endorsed by the federal government—it
is logically impossible that President Trump cut the burden by $86
billion during his first year in office.
While I endeavor to address each estimate from behind a veil of
ignorance as to the political ends of its affiliated organization, I suspect most of the estimates ultimately fail because their authors are
not attempting to dispassionately analyze regulatory costs. Their ideologies assume regulatory costs are highly burdensome, so the researchers select a methodology that allows them to reach that conclusion. The contortions become more strained when the authors want
to prove that the costs of regulations put into place by one administration are far greater than the costs of another.
One would expect that both sides of the political spectrum would
be interested in overall regulatory costs, but that does not turn out to
be the case. I was unable to find any serious modern left-leaning estimates of total regulatory burdens.22 This has largely ceded the field
to conservative organizations, which bring far more passion to the

22. I suspect this may be due to certain subjects being of greater ideological interest to
those institutions. One can find examples of minimizing the cost of specific government programs, however. See, e.g., the Political Economy Research Institute, “Economic Analysis of
Medicare for All” (Nov. 30, 2018) https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1127economic-analysis-of-medicare-for-all (assessing the cost of Sen. Bernie Sanders’s Medicare
For All plan as $13.5 trillion over ten years, roughly $20 trillion less than estimates by relatively
neutral entities like Rand).
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enterprise. This one-sided energy in the field has produced a host of
inaccurate estimates with questionable methodologies.

1. $2 Trillion in annual regulatory costs—only through bad
modeling
During the 2016 presidential campaign, Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross—now a White House advisor on trade and secretary of
commerce, respectively—authored a justification of then-candidate
Trump’s economic plans.23 The report claimed Trump would “reduce the current regulatory burden by a minimum of 10% or $200
billion annually.”24 The authors were working off the assumption that
the annual regulatory burden is about $2 trillion, a figure for which
they cited an influential study by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) from 2014.25 What, in turn, was NAM’s methodology?
To understand the methodology, one must break down specific
contributors to the overall burden. The NAM study’s conclusions, if
true, paint a dire picture of federal regulation. The NAM study posits
an annual regulatory burden of $2.028 trillion, or roughly 11% of
U.S. GDP.26 That staggering share of the economy roughly corresponds to the annual contribution of the entire U.S. manufacturing
sector.27 Of that $2.028 trillion, the NAM study found that “economic” regulations—those that “govern decision-making in market transactions” according to the authors28— imposed by far the highest cost,
$1.448 trillion. Environmental regulation imposed $330 billion, tax
compliance $159 billion, and occupational safety, health, and homeland security regulations $92 billion.29
The short version of NAM’s methodology for calculating the impact of economic regulations which make up 71% of the alleged regulatory burden, is this: (1) use a survey of business leaders to establish
23. Navarro, supra note 3.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id.
26. Crain & Crain, supra note 12; Interactive Access, supra note 10.
27. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY:
THIRD QUARTER 2018, at 9 (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/
gdpind318.pdf.
28. Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 28.
29. Id. at 50.
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the quality of U.S. regulation relative to other nations’ regulations;
(2) compare the regulatory score to the GDP of each country to get a
numerical estimate of how much regulation quality determines
GDP;30 (3) calculate how much larger or smaller the United States
GDP would have been had it received the same score as the top performing countries on regulation quality; and (4) subtract actual U.S.
GDP from U.S. GDP under an optimal regulatory scenario and the
result is the regulatory burden (i.e., the difference between how the
U.S. economy would perform if U.S. regulation matched in quality
the regulation of the highest-ranked countries).31
There are three independently crippling problems with the
study’s implementation of this approach, which I will detail further
below.32
• Conflation of regulatory efficiency and regulatory burden: The authors measured regulatory performance of
the United States relative to other countries and used it to
extract an absolute figure for U.S. regulatory burden;
• Use of evidence not focused on regulatory burden: The
authors used survey data of non-experts to estimate a nuanced and complicated phenomenon; and
• Calculation of the effect on absolute GDP: The authors
used absolute GDP instead of GDP growth, which yields
an over-sensitive model where many minor phenomena
appear far more important than they plausibly could be.

a. Conflating regulatory efficiency and regulatory burden. To

explain the flaws in the methodology used by NAM and relied upon by
the Trump administration, I will start at the broadest conceptual level
before descending into the more technical. At the highest level, this
study is not measuring regulatory burden. It is attempting to measure
how much wealthier the United States would be if its regulatory
structure was similar to that of the “best” regulatory countries in the
world. That is, inherently, a question of relative cost, not absolute cost
30. Statistically savvy readers will recognize this as a regression analysis. I am trying to
keep the terminology simple for lay readers.
31. See Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845 (2018) (an article-length and extremely
thorough accounting of the NAM study, which helped this author much better understand
NAM’s methodology).
32. For a more detailed technical discussion, see id. at 862-75.
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of regulation. The regulatory quality score that NAM relies upon is
measuring businesses perception of how efficient a country seems at
regulation, not how much it regulates.
Perhaps the easiest way to see this flaw is to note the countries
that scored highest in one of the three categories NAM used to calculate regulation quality: Singapore, Qatar, Rwanda, Finland, and
Hong Kong.33 The NAM methodology contends that the United
States economic regulatory burden would be zero if only it regulated
like Finland, a country that regulates far more than the United States.
And, lest we think Finland actually has a regulatory burden of zero,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that relatively inefficient product market regulation imposes a 10% drag on Finnish
productivity.34 Singapore and Qatar are also known for regulatory efficiency, not necessarily light regulation of their economies. It is
simply nonsensical to assume the United States could entirely wipe
out its regulatory burden by successfully matching those countries in
regulatory quality.
On first examination, it is surprising that a business-friendly organization like the National Association of Manufacturers would
make this error because this methodology superficially seems like it
could underestimate the regulatory burden. One can imagine the
regulatory burden as a combination of the cost of the substance of
regulations (e.g., a business must cut emissions of regulated pollutants) and the cost of inefficient regulatory process (e.g., multiple
agencies administer a particular rule, so businesses have to fill out
more paperwork). The NAM methodology examines only the latter
category of costs, so it seems to be ceteris paribus underestimating
the overall burden.
It turns out that ceteris is not paribus in this case. NAM’s methodology does not count substantive burden, but it dramatically overestimates the process burden, allowing the authors to draw the conclusion that the overall burden is vastly larger than it actually is.
From a political perspective, costs due to substance garner far more
33. The survey question was “In your country, how burdensome is it for businesses to
comply with governmental administrative requirements (e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)?”
Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014: Full Data Edition, WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, at 418 (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompeti
tivenessReport_2013-14.pdf.
34. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINLAND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 16/369, at 28
(NOVEMBER 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16369.pdf.
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attention than costs due to process. Indeed, to speak of “deregulation” as process improvements that do not allow any greater freedom
to businesses or individuals sounds strange, if not outright erroneous.
If process improvements can spur bigger gains than substantive deregulation, political opponents of regulation have every incentive to
conflate process improvements with the overall regulatory burden. In
that way, substantive regulatory changes can be presented as the logical solution to the regulatory burden. The NAM study’s methodological emphasis on process improvements rather than substantive
changes in regulation benefits opponents of regulation as long as the
problem is ultimately described as “regulatory burden” instead of
“process deficiencies.”

b. Using evidence not focused on regulatory burden. In the NAM
study, the relative regulatory burden of various countries is based on
a survey given to business executives in 148 countries.35 The NAM
report uses three different survey questions to create a unified
measure of relative regulatory burden. The questions were:
• In your country, how burdensome is it for businesses to
comply with governmental administrative requirements
(e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)?
• In your country, how easy is it for private businesses to
challenge government actions and/or regulations through
the legal system?
• In your country, how effective are the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges?36
The three questions are weighted equally, but only the first has
anything to do with regulatory burdens per se. The second relates to
ease of challenge through the legal system, not the burden of complying nor the cost to the government of enforcement. The third
question is highly ambiguous as to what “effective” means. The police of a totalitarian state are “effective,” but one would not say they
impose a negligible burden on society.
The first question is also ambiguous as to the kind of regulatory
burden—substantive or process. A business leader answering the
35.
36.
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Schwab, supra note 33.
Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at appendix c, 68; Schwab, supra note 33.
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question might find the regulatory burden extremely high (e.g., she
runs a coal mine threatened by climate change-related regulations)
but interpret the question as asking about process because of the reference to “administrative requirements.” In the same vein, the second
question is inquiring about a particular part of the regulatory process
that might be entirely independent from the rest. It is entirely possible that a country has few strict regulations, administers them in a
very efficient way, but does not easily allow for judicial review. In
such a case, the NAM methodology would erroneously peg that
country as having a high regulatory burden. Finally, the third survey
question is obviously focused on a specific part of the economy entirely distinct from the rest. This approach might be more defensible
if the authors evaluated any other distinct segment of the economy,
but they do not.
The use of the survey in the NAM study is further flawed because
the perception of business leaders in a given country is, necessarily,
subjective and grounded in previous history. If the culture is accustomed to a large, intrusive government (e.g., Finland, Singapore),
then the perception of the same substantive regulatory burden will be
very different than in a country with a tradition of a smaller federal
government (e.g., the United States). In that same vein, recent events
will also skew answers. Even with the relatively low substantive regulatory burden of the United States, if the survey were conducted in
the aftermath of a major new regulation, the responses will be abnormally high.

c. Calculating effect on absolute GDP creates an overly sensitive
model. The final, perhaps most damning flaw of the NAM report is
the use of GDP instead of GDP growth when calculating the effect
of regulation. In the NAM study, the authors’ model is being forced
to explain the difference between OECD countries’ per capita GDP
using a proxy for regulatory burden (determined from survey data)
and a few other control variables unlikely to dramatically affect the
outcome.37 Naturally, then, the regulatory burden proxy has to
37. Those variables are foreign trade as a percentage of GDP, the dependency ratio (i.e.,
the ratio of workers to retirees), the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, the ratio of capital investment
to GDP, and size of the labor force. The NAM study authors note that those control variables
are drawn from “empirical literature that examines differences in economic levels across countries over time.” Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 32.
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explain a disproportionately high share of GDP. Through that
methodology, the “burden” of regulations that are less appealing to
business executives in the United States causes a drain of $1.4 trillion
annually on GDP. By contrast, if the authors had correctly used
GDP growth instead of per capita GDP—the standard practice in
econometric studies of this nature38— they would have found that
their measure of regulatory burden is positively correlated with
growth. That is, of course, a nonsensical outcome, suggesting that
something is wrong with the NAM model for regulatory burden.
In order to estimate the effect of regulation, the authors needed
to construct a model of factors that contribute to GDP in order to
isolate the effect of regulation. In reality, the single most powerful
factor in predicting any year’s GDP is almost laughably simple: the
previous year’s GDP. Consider it this way: India had a GDP of about
$2.6 trillion in 2017, while the United States had a GDP of $19.4
trillion. Now suppose you had to predict which country, as of 2019,
has a GDP of $21.5 trillion. The United States is the obvious guess
because it only needed to grow a small amount to get there.
To draw a parallel to the NAM methodology, now assume that
your model cannot reference the previous year’s GDP. To figure out
which country now has a GDP of $21.5 trillion, you would essentially
have to force the model to overweigh whatever other factors are being considered, such as the educational level of the country, or its
weather. Whatever factor in which the United States is doing better
than India suddenly looks far more important than it actually is.39
Using that same model and replacing regulatory burden with
other survey data from the OECD business executive survey produces absurd results, showing how silly the model is in the first place. A
deficit of public trust in politicians carries an annual cost to the United States of $1.863 trillion. Organized crime imposes $1.993 trillion.

38. Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback
Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845, 866 (2018).

39. One could inquire why the previous year’s GDP is so determinative. A helpful way
to think about it is that the previous year’s GDP is the result of the entire history of the country
to that year. Taking India and the United States as our examples. Everything from radically
different experiences of colonialism to different climates to different geopolitical challenges
factored into the previous year’s GDP. A model that neglects to account for the previous year’s
GDP must instead recreate all those complicated factors explicitly in the model if it is to be
equally accurate. Such a model is for all practical purposes impossible to create.
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A lack of perfect judicial independence imposes a whopping $1.352
trillion, about as much as NAM’s economic regulatory burden.40
If GDP growth is used instead of per capita GDP, it turns out the
effect of the regulatory burden as defined in the NAM study is not
statistically significant and negative in sign—that is, regulatory burden seems to increase GDP growth. While the idea that regulatory
burden increases growth is obviously incorrect, the statistical quirk
indicates the underlying obtuseness of the NAM survey. The only
way to find a massive regulatory burden in the data used by NAM is
to use the wrong variable. Using the right variable simply reveals that
the model does not work.

d. Problems with the non-economic parts of the study. While the
other components in the $2.028 trillion estimate of overall regulatory
burden are far smaller than the $1.4 trillion from economic
regulation, they also have methodological flaws. To quote one review
of the NAM study’s environmental methodology: “[T]he number in
question is taken from a 1991 study of pre-1988 vintage
environmental regulations, which drew its number from an earlier
general equilibrium exercise that has since been thoroughly examined
and de-bunked by outside scholars.”41
Other categories of regulation comprising the $2.028 trillion estimate that do not fit comfortably with the concept of regulatory
burden include tax and security compliance. The NAM study includes $159 billion for tax compliance42 and $21 billion for homeland
security compliance.43 While the tax system is a burden placed on individuals and businesses by government, it does not directly restrict
private sector activities. Homeland security regulations may incidentally restrict private sector activities—e.g., forbidding citizens
from building nuclear power plants in their backyard—but including
them as part of the regulatory burden potentially expands the concept
of regulatory burden beyond recognition. If homeland security regulations are included, why not include costs imposed by the Department of Defense? Those costs include the exclusive use of some parts
40. Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback
Movement, 45 ECOLOGY L. QUARTERLY 845, 869 (2018).
41. Id. at 854.
42. Crain & Crain, supra note 12 at 39.
43. Id. at 37.
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of the electromagnetic spectrum, the use of land for bases, the diversion of personnel from peacetime pursuits because of their employment in the military, etc. I have not seen any studies include those
costs in overall regulatory burden, presumably because security is
generally considered a core function of the state rather than regulation.
To summarize, this highly cited estimate of regulatory burden
falls short because of methodological choices that seem tailor-made
to support a high estimate. This is perfectly understandable—NAM
is an advocacy organization, and it makes sense for it to overstate the
cost of regulations with obtuse but non-fraudulent methodologies.
However, a neutral observer should not use the NAM estimate as a
starting point for understanding the effect of Trump’s deregulatory
actions, even if the administration itself cites the $2 trillion figure.

2. $1.9 trillion in regulatory costs—by simply not trying to produce a
credible estimate
The difficulty of estimating regulatory costs has led to stunning
examples of misplaced trust in think tank estimates. For example, the
Trump administration cited a May 2017 study by the Competitive
Enterprise Institute (CEI), Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of

All Cost of Regulation Estimates And the Need to Compile Them
Anyway,44 that pegged annual regulatory costs at about $1.9 trillion.45
Many other Republican elected officials have cited CEI’s estimate,
including presidential candidates, senators, and representatives.46 The

44. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Tip of the Costberg: On the Invalidity of All Cost of Regulation Estimates and the Need to Compile Them Anyway (Jan. 8, 2017) (Working Paper)

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2502883.
45. Navarro, supra note 3, at 6.
46. Examples include former Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, Michael C. Bender and
Bloomberg News, Jeb Bush Says Regulation Changes Can Lift Wages, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 22,
2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-news-bc-bush-wages22-20150922story.html; Senator James Lankford, Press Release, Office of Senator Lankford, Federal Fumbles 100 Ways the Government Dropped the Ball (2015), https://www.lankford.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/Federal_Fumbles_2015.pdf; Senator Mike Rounds, Press Release, Office of
Senator Rounds, Rounds Introduced RESTORE To Permanently Address Regulatory Reform,
(May 20, 2015), https://www.rounds.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rounds-introducesrestore-to-permanently-address-regulatory-reform; Senator Ron Johnson, Press Release, Office
of Senator Ron Johnson, How Will You Pay Your Family’s $15,000 in Regulatory Costs? (Apr.
18, 2014), https://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/in-the-news?ID=bca085fa18b5-4bf0-9283-2180950524b6; Senator Shelley Moore Capito, Lori Robertson, GOP Convention Day 2, FACTCHECK (July 20, 2016) https://www.factcheck.org/2016/07/gop-
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$1.9 trillion formulation was so popular that it started being misinterpreted as the burden solely attributable to Obama administration
regulations.47
For a report cited so widely, it surprisingly lacks even a veneer of
credibility. The report cites studies that use methodology similar to
that of the more serious but methodologically hopeless NAM study
discussed at length above and extrapolates from OMB reports published around the turn of the century.48 Using this hodgepodge of
questionable or outdated sources, the report concludes that the regulatory burden is very large. The salient, damning technical features of
this report are identical to those of the NAM study: using GDP instead of GDP growth; using survey data; and using relative regulatory
efficiency as a proxy for absolute regulatory burden.
What is distinctive about the CEI report is that it is explicitly
presented as flippant and partisan. The title should be a warning that
the estimate is not particularly meaningful, and the report itself gleefully agrees. The paper, to its credit, several times states that its numbers are not in any sense real. Its language is forthright and nonacademic: “I’m more apt to call the figures I assemble ‘placeholders’
for a subset of costs than concretely known costs, and in most instances the reader can interpret them that way. After all, we ‘measure’
GDP, and that’s not measurable either . . . .”49 Perhaps even more
bluntly: “A wave of assumptions and guesses without scholarly pretension underlie this tally, but the intent is serious.”50 Later, when
explaining an estimate of the cost of “economic regulation,” the author explains: “By summing these estimates and then folding them in
N-dimensional hyperspace, blowing on them twice and taking the

convention-day-2/; Senator Mike Lee, Sen. Mike Lee and Rep Mark Walker, Make government accountable again, WASH. EXAMINER, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/make-

government-accountable-again); and Representatives Bob Goodlatte and Lynn Jenkins. Glenn
Kessler, The claim that American households have a $15,000 regulatory ‘burden,’ WASH. POST
(Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/01/14/theclaim-that-american-households-have-a-15000-regulatory-burden/.
47. David Sherfinski, Obama’s regulations in 2016 to drain economy by $2 trillion,
WASH. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/31/obamasregulations-in-2016-to-drain-economy-by-2-t/.
48. Crews, supra note 44, at 12.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 10.
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non-derivative, we arrive at an estimate of economic regulatory costs
of [$402.05 billion annually].”51
This report, which is more a provocative bit of art meant to highlight the lack of serious estimates of regulatory costs than a meaningful source of information, pervades discussions of overall regulatory
burden. In addition to the Trump administration and the senators
and representatives discussed earlier, many media outlets have presented the CEI study as credible. To be sure, most are conservativeleaning, but some are assuredly mainstream, including USA Today;52
Wall Street Journal;53 The Hill;54 Forbes;55 and the Daily Caller.56
And, of course, many think tanks and right-leaning groups have
repeated the CEI study’s claims, including: the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce;57 Freedomworks;58 the Federalist Society (through an affiliated enterprise called the “Regulatory Transparency Project”);59
the Heartland Institute;60 the Mises Organization;61 and the Club for
Growth.62
51. Id. at 37.
52. Luke Hilgemann, More Regulations Equals Less Business, USA TODAY, (Feb. 28,
2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/02/28/economy-health-businesses-entrepreneurship-column/22590839/.
53. Washington’s Hidden Tax: $1.9 Trillion, WALL STREET J., (May 11, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/washingtons-hidden-tax-1-9-trillion-1431385233.
54. J.T. Young, Time for a Regulatory Budget, THE HILL, (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/417019-time-for-a-regulatory-budget.
55. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Obama’s 2016 Federal Budget and Middle Class Economics, FORBES, (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2015/02/02/obamas-fy2016-federal-budget-and-middle-class-economics/#3d7c6eaf67e3.
56. Ethan Barton, Economy Hit with Hidden $1.9 Trillion Tax from Federal Regulations, DAILY CALLER, (May 4, 2016), https://dailycaller.com/2016/05/04/economy-hit-withhidden-1-9-trillion-tax-from-federal-regulations/.
57. The Regulatory Impact on Small Business: Complex. Cumbersome. Costly, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM. FOUND., (Mar. 2017), https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/smallbiz
regs/assets/files/Small_Business_Regulation_Study.pdf.
58. Patrick Hedger, Regulatory Review April 21-May 4, 2018, FREEDOMWORKS, (May
4, 2018), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/regulatory-review-april-21-may-4-2018.
59. Time for a Regulatory Budget, REG. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://regproject.org/time-regulatory-budget/.
60. Kenneth Artz, Federal Regulations Cost Americans $1.9 Trillion in 2017, THE
HEARTLAND INST., (Jul. 19, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/federalregulations-cost-americans-19-trillion-in-2017.
61. Tho Bishop, CEI: Federal Regulations Cost $1.9 Trillion Annually, MISES INST.,
(May 10, 2018), https://mises.org/power-market/cei-federal-regulations-cost-19-trillionannually.
62. John Merline, Federal Regulations Now Cost Almost $1.9 Trillion, Study Finds,
CLUB FOR GROWTH, (May 4, 2016), https://www.clubforgrowth.org/31016-2/.
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Ironically, one of the few things the CEI study gets correct is the
dearth of serious studies of overall regulatory costs. In the absence of
such studies, the field is occupied by the CEI study, the NAM study
discussed previously, a few other similar partisan exercises, and the
official estimate issued by OMB.

3. OMB: $78 to $115 billion, but with a non-comprehensive
approach
The Office of Management and Budget annually issues its own
estimate of total regulatory costs by summing the cost estimates of
major rules, agency by agency, for rules finalized over the past ten
years. The 2017 edition, the first issued under the Trump administration, pegged the range of regulatory costs at $78 to $115 billion.63 Its methodology is far more conservative than that of the
right-leaning think tanks. OMB simply identifies rules for which
agencies have identified the costs, then adds the costs together.64
This approach is inherently less risky than developing a model to
estimate total regulatory burden, but it has clear shortcomings. Not
every rule has a cost estimate, and not every rule is included in
OMB’s analysis. For example, OMB includes in its review only “major” rules that have an estimated cost of at least $100 million over at
least one year.65 In its 2017 review of regulations issued from fiscal
year 2007 through fiscal year 2016, OMB reviewed 2,670 final rules,
of which 609 were “major” rules. During that period, federal agencies
issued 36,255 final rules.66
Clearly, the aggregation of all those smaller rules without formal
cost estimates might have a substantial effect. It is not certain that
they do, however, because many of the rules in question have essentially zero impact on private sector compliance costs. OMB under
both Republican and Democrat administrations has asserted that major rules constitute a majority of regulatory costs.67 Taking that asser63. 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
64. OMB formerly used a model-based approach, producing estimates far higher than
their current ones. Those estimates are cited by studies like Costberg as cover for high estimates. Given that the organizations that put them out 18 years ago do not use the same methodology now, those studies should not be given similar credence.
65. 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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tion at face value means that the costs could not be more than doubled by these non-major rules. Even doubled, the $78 to $115 billion
OMB estimate of overall regulatory costs would be a small fraction of
the costs estimated by the model-based studies described above.
The reliability of agency cost-benefit analysis has been studied
and does not dramatically alter the conclusions above. Agencies tend
to systematically overestimate both costs and benefits.68 On the costs
side, agencies often underestimate the ability of the private sector to
cope with a restriction. If a particular technology is outlawed, another
arises to take its place, or a wholly unrelated process arises to achieve
the same end. To be fair, agencies probably should not lower cost estimates to reflect uncertain technological solutions. However, at the
very least, this tendency should counteract the urge to raise OMB’s
cost estimates to reflect non-major rules.69

4. Overall regulatory burden as a symptom of broader empirical
problems
The studies analyzed above suggest a profound truth about empirical estimates of regulatory burdens: they have often been either
comprehensive or credible, but not both. To the extent there was a
nationwide debate about the regulatory burden before the Trump
administration, it was based on an unrealistic image of how economically significant the costs of regulation are. If one trusted the most
recent federal estimates, there was little economic impact from overregulation per se, even if regulation could be more efficient. If one
looked to think tank and industry estimates, regulation was strangling
off perhaps as much as 20% of GDP annually. Those studies of total
regulatory burden set the stage for estimates of Trump-specific savings from deregulation.

68. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, at 11 (Jan. 21, 2016).
69. While this paper does not focus on regulatory benefits, the explanation for how
agencies overestimate benefits is probably similar in some respects. If a rule is meant to stop a
particular activity, but industry can carry out a similar activity with a new technology or process, it is entirely conceivable that the intended benefits will be dampened. A very common
conservative criticism is that agencies deliberately overestimate benefits in order to justify regulatory action. The tendency of costs to be overestimated as well suggests that other factors carry
more explanatory weight.
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C. Existing Estimates of Trump’s Regulatory Cost Savings

Understanding the difficulties of estimating regulatory burden
helps explain the existing estimates of Trump’s regulatory cost reductions. These estimates generally match the pattern that preceded
Trump: federal estimates based on aggregation of specific rules might
not tell the whole story, and partisan extrapolations based on poor
modeling or skewed data are simply not credible. The significant difference from overall regulatory burden estimates is that partisan passions engendered by the Trump era have made methodological errors
even more egregious.
OMB’s estimate paints a frankly unimpressive picture. OMB’s official estimate of deregulatory savings from the beginning of the
Trump presidency through the end of fiscal year 2018 was $23.57
billion. However, taking a closer look at the specific deregulatory actions included in that figure, it’s clear that the overwhelming majority
of identified rules and savings come from actions deemed “deregulatory,” but which are really just tweaks in payment formulas. As I discuss below, using a generous definition of what constitutes a true
“deregulatory” action, as of the end of fiscal year 2018, there had
been only three major deregulatory actions by the Trump administration accounting for a total of about $100 million in annual cost
reduction.
Think tank and media estimates of deregulatory savings paint a
different picture, but largely by measuring something other than the
real or predicted economic effects of finalized actions. Instead, they
project forward based on unrealistic assumptions about hypothetical
actions. For example, if the Trump administration delays implementation of a regulation that will have a $1 billion cost, this delay is portrayed as “potentially” saving up to $1 billion. In every case, the regulation will either go forward as planned at a later date, or at best will
be replaced by another rule that might cost, say, $950 million instead
of $1 billion. Breathless assertions of “potential” savings appear intended to produce positive headlines rather than actual assessments
of regulatory savings.
Ultimately, there is little choice for now but to accept the federal
estimates because the think tank/industry estimates have major, identifiable flaws. But the failure of the think tank/industry studies, detailed further below, helps point the direction toward the synthesis of
approaches that will constitute Part II of this article.
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1. Gossamer think tank estimates: $60 billion or $86 billion in
“potential” savings
Think tank estimates of regulatory savings generally take one of
two approaches. The first is to present regulatory cost estimates in a
carefully worded, accurate, but misleading way, which allows less rigorous media outlets to further muddy the waters with simpler but incorrect headlines. This approach allows the think tanks to be technically correct, but they must operate in such a confusing manner that
their results are like fine glass: beautiful, but easily destroyed by the
slightest mistake in handling.
An example: the Washington Free Beacon declared on April 20,
2017—exactly three months into the Trump administration—
“Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in Regulatory Savings.”70 The
article linked to a study by the American Action Forum (AAF), which
describes itself as “lead[ing] the center-right on economic and fiscal
policy issues.”71 Other media outlets cited the same report and
claimed $86 billion in savings. The Washington Examiner ran the
headline: “Trump reg cuts save immediate $3.7 billion, $86 billion
overall.”72 An opinion piece in The Hill was more breathless still:
“Study: Trump has eliminated $86B in regs.”73

70. Elizabeth Harrington, Report: Trump Rolls Back $60 Billion More in Regulatory
Savings, WASH. FREE BEACON (Apr. 20, 2017), https://freebeacon.com/issues/report-trump-

rolls-back-60-billion-regulatory-savings/.
71. Sam Batkins, Tracking Regulatory Modernization in the Trump Administration,
AMERICAN ACTION FORUM, (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/
tracking-regulatory-modernization-trump-administration.
72. Paul Bedard, Trump Reg Cuts Save Immediate $3.7Billion, $86 Billion Overall,
WASH. EXAMINER (May 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-reg-cuts-saveimmediate-37-billion-86-billion-overall.
73. Tim Devaney, Study: Trump Has Eliminated $86B in Regs, THE HILL (Apr. 20,
2017), https://thehill.com/regulation/329720-study-trump-has-eliminated-86b-in-regs.
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The bizarre difference in something as simple as the bottom line
arises from AAF’s very careful wording. The $60 billion figure came
in the conclusion of the study, which stated (emphasis added):
Regulatory reform has taken many shapes during the Trump administration: CRA votes, increased flexibility in compliance, and
formal reviews of major rules. As AAF has documented, this has the
ability to generate more than $60 billion in cost savings . . . .74

To their credit, the authors included in the actual report a specific estimate of estimated future savings: “$4.1 billion in total net present value costs” between CRA resolutions and executive actions.75
The $60 billion figure links to another AAF report, which tracks “executive actions seeking regulatory rescissions and formal delays.”76 A
table then describes the total cost of each rule being delayed. The information is presented as “Totals: $55.1 billion in affected costs.”77
Note that this is the total cost of delayed rules, not the total savings
from repealed rules. A delayed rule will simply impose the same costs
at a later date.
To summarize that circuitous journey: the administration delayed
some rules, AAF displayed a table showing “totals” of “affected costs”
related to those rules, and a media source interpreted that as actual
cost savings. In reality, the $55.1 billion figure is meaningless. It is
the total, final cost of rules that continued in some form with a mere
delay in implementation. The actual completed deregulatory actions
selected by AAF accounted for $4.1 billion in present value, and “rule
delays” added another $12.2 billion in “affected costs.”78 That vague
accounting yielded the conclusion that deregulation “has the ability
to generate more than $60 billion in cost savings . . . .”79

74. Sam Batkins, Fiscal Benefits of the CRA, Regulatory Reform, AMERICAN ACTION
FORUM (April 20, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/fiscal-benefits-craregulatory-reform/ (emphasis added).
75. Batkins, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. The AAF accounting also includes rules that are only deregulatory in a technical
sense.
79. Batkins, supra note 74.
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The $86 billion figure’s provenance is simpler, but even more erroneous. The AAF study notes that one of the rules undone by a
Congressional Review Act vote was the Department of Education’s
”Accountability and State Plans” measure.80 The report notes that the
regulatory measure contained conditions for accessing federal appropriations for state and local educational agencies.81 Those funds totaled $86.9 billion.82 AAF explicitly notes: “This denunciation of the
regulation, however, does not speak to the form of a substitute rule
or if the $86 billion in spending will return (which it likely will).”83
The $86 billion is thus not cost savings by any fair discernment of
regulatory costs, a fact which did not stop multiple media outlets—
and a book by Laura Ingraham and the Trump reelection campaign—from claiming it.84
While organizations like AAF, to their credit, usually stay on the
right side of the line between truth and falsehoods in their confusing
but transparent analyses, their reports tend more toward puffery than
actual analysis. Tabulating the value of every rule that might be
changed in some way and then presenting that as “potential” savings
is, at best, unhelpful in determining the actual effect of deregulatory
actions. At worst, it is knowingly misleading less meticulous entities
like the Washington Free Beacon into generating bombastic propaganda.

2. Hybrid think tank/industry estimates: sloppy language, unrealistic
assumptions, big mistakes
In some cases, think tanks entirely or partially rely on industry estimates, which can lead to skewed accounting. While industry estimates can be credible, they understandably carry the stigma of selfinterest and sometimes do not stand up to scrutiny. This was particularly evident in the context of the seventeen deregulatory Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolutions signed into law by President
Trump. While Trump’s deregulatory agenda is generally confined to
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

LAURA INGRAHAM, BILLIONAIRE AT THE BARRICADES: THE POPULIST
REVOLUTION FROM REAGAN TO TRUMP 249 (2018); First 100 Days: The Truth Mainstream
Media Refuses to Tell, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/100.
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the executive branch, the CRA resolutions largely terminated rules
adopted toward the end of the Obama administration.85 When fourteen of the seventeen rules had been terminated, AAF issued an analysis of the economic effect of the CRA resolutions up to that point.86
It dutifully surveyed the regulatory impact analyses for the rules in
question, which in their estimation added up to $3.7 billion in total
regulatory costs.87 AAF also included industry cost estimates, which it
pegged at a shockingly high $34.8 billion.88
Three aspects of AAF’s analysis are worth delving into. First, obviously, the vast difference between the federal agencies’ estimates
and industry’s demands explanation. Second, on closer inspection,
the summation of the federal agency estimates appears to be flat-out
incorrect. Third, the numbers are, whether innocently or not, presented in a misleading manner that prompted outsiders to add together the two estimates.
The summation of federal estimates should have been the easiest
part of this exercise: simply take the agency cost estimates from the
regulatory impact analyses of each rule and add them up. Obviously,
one would need to take the costs over the same period in order to
give some sense of comparison. AAF either used an undisclosed
methodology or made a mistake in finding the federal cost estimates.
For example, the stream buffer rule’s official annual compliance cost
estimate is $81 million for industry and $720,000 for regulators from
2020 to 2040.89 AAF claimed that the federal estimate for total cost
was “$1.2 billion” over an unspecified period.90 It is not simply the
85. Two of the 17 CRA resolutions struck down rules promulgated by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which due to its independence was able to continue
adopting substantive new rules for some time during the Trump administration. One of the
CRA resolutions blocked a CFPB rule adopted during the Trump administration. See
S.J.Res.57, “A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title
5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to ‘Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’”,
115th Cong. (2018) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/57
86. Sam Batkins, The Congressional Review Act in 2017, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM
(May 10, 2017) https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/15550/.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93066 (2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts.
700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 782, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/12/20/2016-29958/stream-protectionrule#p-3034.
90. Batkins, supra note 86.
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annual cost estimate multiplied by 20 years ($1.6 billion), and it is not
the present discounted value of $81 million over 20 years ($868 million). AAF may have derived the $1.2 billion from the federal estimate, but if so, it is not clear how.
Why harp so much on $1.2 billion? As far as I can find, only one
federal entity of any kind endorsed the $1.2 billion figure—the communications team at the White House, which used the number in a
press release.91 However, if we are estimating the effect of Trump’s
deregulatory actions, then repeal of the stream buffer rule did not
save the economy $1.2 billion in 2017. Taken at face value, repeal
would have saved $81 million annually had the rule been in effect.
The failure to get the federal estimate right pales in comparison
to the unreliability of the industry estimate for the cost of the stream
buffer rule—$29 billion, or 83% of AAF’s total supposed savings
from the CRA deregulatory actions. That estimate utterly dwarfs the
federal estimate of $81 million per year, and singlehandedly explains
almost all of the difference between the federal and industry cost estimates.
Such a vast difference suggests a major methodological problem,
and, indeed, the industry estimate which was later used by AAF has
one: sampling. The report’s author simply asked respondents to estimate changes in production and costs because of the stream buffer
rule. There were thirty-six mine owners included in the survey “from
firms representing over 66% of the national coal production in the
U.S.”92 The report does not specify the mines, so we have no way of
knowing if their costs are representative. We also cannot know the
validity of the responses, since mine owners would have an incentive
to offer an inflated estimate.
There is good reason to suspect that a nonrepresentative sample
was used: the report was prepared in 2015 for the National Mining
Association, an industry group with an interest in maximizing the ap-

91. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING’S STREAM
PROTECTION RULE: AN OVERVIEW (Jan. 2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20170111_R44150_aeb8ad15c32441ec3bdb6788400bda94f4aa8d86.pdf (no mention of a
$1.2 billion cost estimate); see also WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
UNLEASHES AMERICA’S ENERGY POTENTIAL (Jun. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-unleashes-americas-energy-potential/.
92. RAMBOLL ENVIRON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED STREAM PROTECTION
RULE 12 (2015), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/10/26/document_gw_01.pdf.
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parent cost of the regulation.93 Methodological problems notwithstanding, the $29 billion figure has been cited by dozens of Republican politicians and right-leaning think-tanks, practically never with
any documentation.94
On the basis of its survey, the authors of the National Mining Association report calculated that there would be a decrease in coal
production of between 263.1 and 629.7 million short tons because of
the stream protection rule over the life of the rule.95 When the report
was written, that constituted about 35%–72% of annual U.S. coal
production.96 For comparison, the Obama-era Department of the Interior predicted the rule would decrease coal production by a total of
0.08% from 2020 to 2040.97
Finally, AAF presented the two estimates ($3.7 billion and $34.8
billion) as agency cost and industry cost, which a casual reader might
take to mean the regulation’s cost to the federal government and the
cost to the industries affected.98 Indeed, media outlets like the Washington Times did interpret the language in that way.99 As we have

93. See id. The report also became the subject of debate because it projected up to
77,000 lost jobs, a figure later cited by Senator Rand Paul and President Trump. Glenn Kessler,
Did President Trump Save 77,000 Coal Mining Jobs?, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2017, 1:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/02/27/did-president-trumpsave-77000-coal-mining-jobs/?utm_term=.1ad368cd1d2a.
94. See, e.g., The Development and Potential Implementation of the Office of Surface

Mining, Reclamation, and Enforcement’s Proposed Stream Protection Rule: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. U.S. S., 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Sen. Lisa

Murkowski, Chairman, S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/CHRG-114shrg98945/pdf/CHRG-114shrg98945.pdf.
95. RAMBOLL, supra note 92, at 19.
96. Id.
97. Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066, 93,069 (December 20, 2016) (codified
at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, and 827),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-20/pdf/2016-29958.pdf.
98. Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional Review Act, WASH. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2017/may/15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congres/ (“The American
Action Forum, a conservative-leaning think tank, calculated repealing the rules could save the
economy millions of hours of paperwork and $3.7 billion in regulatory costs to the federal
agencies, and perhaps $35 billion in compliance costs for industry.”); Press Release, Am. Action
Forum, AAF Analysis Finds Congress Could Save $40 Billion in Regulatory Costs Using the
CRA (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/aaf-analysis-findscongress-save-40-billion-regulatory-costs-using-cra/ (citing nearly $40 billion in regulatory
costs).
99. Dinan, supra note 98.
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seen, however, it is actually referring to the cost estimate from agencies or from industry.

ffK==qçï~êÇ=~=_ÉííÉê=bëíáã~íÉ=çÑ=oÉÖìä~íçêó=p~îáåÖë=
Now that we understand the existing estimates and their limitations, we can try to come up with a good faith estimate of our own
for annual regulatory costs saved through Trump administration deregulatory actions. We have seen the divide in overall regulatory
burden studies between statistical models of regulatory costs and federal agency estimates for particular rules. Cognizant of the pitfalls of
each approach, I split regulatory savings into two categories. The first
is “hard” regulatory savings, the reduction in cost attributable to specific completed deregulatory acts. To establish “hard” savings, I review OMB’s compilation of deregulatory actions, removing rules that
are either not specifically attributable to President Trump or which
are only “deregulatory” in a technical sense. The second regulatory
savings category, “soft” benefits, is composed of nebulous but important savings from things like a reduced expectation within the
business community of near-term regulation. To get some understanding of the scale of “soft” benefits, I review available data on
business investment and the various factors which would weaken
“soft” benefits.

A. Distilling “Hard” Deregulatory Activities: About $200 Million
Annually
The first step in assessing full regulatory costs must be an accounting of specific actions. The OMB estimate discussed earlier is a
good place to start. Once we establish a clear definition for “deregulation,” we can find qualifying rules among OMB’s list.

1. What should count as “deregulation,” and how does it differ from
OMB’s definition?
Defining “deregulation” in a meaningful way requires understanding what people actually mean by “regulation.” The original
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meaning of the term is to control by rule, or direct.100 Scholars, politicians, and commentators who believe the federal government has
too many requirements want to deregulate, to allow deviation from a
federally prescribed norm. Logically, deregulation would then be removing a mandatory standard for participants in a given industry.
That simple logic does not reflect the actual classification scheme
used by OMB. Pursuant to Executive Order 13771, OMB’s definition
of “deregulation” is, simply, “an action that has been finalized and
has total costs less than zero.”101 That expansive definition can lead to
absurd situations where easing eligibility for federal benefits counts as
deregulation if it requires less effort on the part of private entities to
apply for the benefits.
For the sake of simplicity, I propose adding a caveat to OMB’s
definition: a regulatory action that amends eligibility for a federal
benefit is not deregulation. Such actions might be independently desirable on efficiency or other grounds, but they are not removing a
mandatory standard for participation in a private industry. Such rules
are better understood as agencies setting the terms by which agencies
interact with outsiders, not the terms by which those outsiders can
participate in a non-government activity. Put another way, a deregulatory action must reduce private sector costs that accrue primarily
because of a federal restriction on activity, not because of an offer of
federal funds.102 Expenses incurred in the pursuit of federal funds
would include such obviously non-regulatory burden categories as
lobbying expenses, job-search costs for would-be federal employees,
time spent on grant applications, and even arguably campaign donations or parties thrown on behalf of elected officials. None of those
expenses relate to the federal government’s standardization of private
sector activity.

100. Regulate, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regulate (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
101. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMO M17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771, TITLED “REDUCING
REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” (2017), https://www.white
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf.
102. Rules that alter the eligibility for federal benefits could be desirable in and of themselves, either for efficiency reasons (e.g., making a form easier to fill out) or, from a certain ideological vantage point, because they reduce the size of government (e.g., imposing work requirements for welfare benefits). In either case, the goal is not deregulation per se.
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One other caveat is necessary: we must not count cost reductions
for deregulatory actions that have not gone into effect. This is a major departure from the OMB methodology, which counts rules once
they are finalized. It is important at this stage to remember our original purpose: judging the economic effect of deregulation. To achieve
that end, it does not make sense to count rules that never actually
forced anyone to do anything. The distinction between “finalized”
and “in effect” may seem fine, but it is vital in assessing actual impact
on the economy. Frequently, major rules are finalized, but then
stayed by court action.103 While the litigation is pending—sometimes
for years—the rule cannot fairly be said to be a regulatory burden
since no companies actually have to meet it. On the flip side, if a deregulatory rule has not yet actually altered an existing requirement,
its effect on “hard” costs is minimal. Furthermore, litigation against
the rule might succeed, whether by outright winning in court or by
delaying the rule’s implementation until a new president takes office
and withdraws the rule.
To be sure, the reduced expectation of future regulation can have
a major economic effect. However, for purposes of our analysis, we
will analyze those “soft” effects of deregulation separately. For now,
we concern ourselves only with the quantifiable effects of deregulatory actions already taken.

2. Merging OMB’s estimate of “hard” savings with actual
deregulation
The official federal estimate for the total cost savings of Trump’s
deregulatory actions is $23.57 billion as of the end of fiscal year 2018,
comprising $570 million in fiscal year 2017 and $23 billion in fiscal
year 2018.104 As discussed earlier, the $23.57 billion figure is over an
indefinite time horizon, meaning it is the present value of all expected future savings. The figure actually amounts to $1.6 billion annually.105 These numbers must be seen as the most credible estimate
103. The Clean Power Plan is one obvious recent example which will be discussed later
in this article.
104. OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY REFORM RESULTS
FISCAL
YEAR
2018
(2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190608110347;
FOR
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaEO13771 (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
105. Alan Levin & Alyza Sebenius, Trump Claims $1.6 Billion a Year Saved from Cutting Red Tape, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
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of “hard” regulatory savings to date, but even they must be taken
with a grain of salt. OMB’s numbers are the product of agency estimates, and the agencies in question are headed by and replete with
Trump administration political appointees. It is in their interest to
inflate the number as much as possible. However, OMB’s report has
one important factor in its favor: OMB’s estimate is startlingly low.
Because OMB had every incentive to inflate, the low estimate presents a significant case for credibility, at least as a starting point for
our analysis.106

a. How significant is $1.6 billion in annual regulatory savings? If
that truly is the total value of Trump deregulation, then deregulation is
very nearly meaningless in the overall economy—a maximum $3.2
billion drop in a roughly $40 trillion ocean of U.S. GDP in 2017 and
2018. Worse still, because the number is only costs avoided and does not
include the benefits given up through repeal of the rules in question, the
true effect of deregulation would be lower still.
From another perspective, the $1.6 billion in annual savings
claimed by the Trump administration OMB could be as much as 2%
of the overall regulatory burden if one accepts OMB’s total regulatory burden range of $78 billion to $115 billion.107 Viewed through that
prism, Trump’s deregulatory effort might seem more substantial.
However, there are important caveats to that manner of examining
the $1.6 billion figure. From a purely technical perspective, the $1.6
billion annual figure includes the withdrawal of regulations that were
not finalized. OMB’s overall estimate of a $78 to $115 billion burden
counted only final rules, so the $1.6 billion in deregulatory actions
does not directly compare to the $78 to $115 billion estimate of annual overall cost.

news/articles/2018-10-17/trump-administration-claims-23-billion-in-regulation-savings.
106. This is analogous to the criterion of embarrassment in biblical interpretation, which
broadly suggests that parts of the Bible which would have been most embarrassing for the authors to concede are the most likely to be grounded in historical fact. If they were not grounded
in fact, why would the authors include them? See, e.g., JOHN P. MEIER, A MARGINAL JEW:
RETHINKING THE HISTORICAL JESUS. VOLUME I: RETHINKING THE HISTORICAL JESUS,
ANCHOR BIBLE REFERENCE LIBRARY 168 (1991).
107. 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
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b. Narrowing the OMB list of deregulatory rules A more

substantial flaw in the OMB list is its legalistic methodology. Few of the
actions included are the sort one would associate with real, substantive
deregulation. Some background is necessary to appreciate this point. By
OMB terminology, a significant regulation has a non-zero economic
effect; major regulation has an economic effect of greater than $100
million.108
At the end of fiscal year 2018, OMB reported eliminating 176
regulatory actions while issuing “only 14 new significant regulatory
actions,” concluding that it had achieved a twelve to one ratio of deregulatory to regulatory actions.109 This is misleading. OMB is comparing all deregulatory actions with new significant regulatory actions. There were actually fifty-seven significant deregulatory actions
compared to fourteen significant regulatory actions—a four to one
ratio on significant actions. However, one can break the numbers
down further by including only major actions. There were nineteen
major actions, four of which were classified as regulatory.110 We are
now reduced to a universe of fifteen major deregulatory actions.
Of those fifteen actions, twelve are primarily concerned with redistributing payments among program recipients or changing the
manner in which people or entities are billed or compensated under
existing federal programs. These actions are considered “deregulatory” by OMB because they incidentally reduce private sector costs, but
under the definition of “deregulation” developed above, they should
not be considered deregulatory. These actions do not relate to restrictions on activities by the private sector. Rather, they relate to the
manner in which outside groups obtain federal benefits. The purpose
108. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
101, at 3; 2017 DRAFT REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
109. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 2018
REGULATORY REFORM REPORT: CUTTING THE RED TAPE, UNLEASHING ECONOMIC
FREEDOM 3 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2018-UnifiedAgenda-Cutting-the-Red-Tape.pdf.
110. OMB categorized 20 major deregulatory actions, but actual inspection of the rules
reveals one that was apparently miscategorized. A rule on disposal of coal combustion residues
was classified major by OMB in its report, but the regulatory impact analysis associated with the
rule says it is not a major rule. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal
of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum
Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36,435, 36,451 (Jul. 30, 2018) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 257), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/07/30/2018-16262/hazardous-and-solid-waste-management-system-disposal-of-coal-combustion-residuals-fromelectric.
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of the actions is thus not related to reducing regulatory burden on
the private sector, and it is not reasonable to consider them part of a
broader deregulatory agenda.
As an example typical of the twelve actions in question, the Medicare rule “Updates to the Quality Payment Program” tweaks an existing program offering higher Medicare payment rates for physicians
who follow best practices for treatment.111 Adjustments to the methods of evaluating physician performance for calendar year 2018 resulted in a $13.9 million reduction to the private sector cost of collecting the information required to participate in the program.112
However, the agency predicts those changes will lead to “[a]dditional
federal expenditures includ[ing] approximately $675 to $900 million
in [] incentive payments to [qualifying physicians].”113 This is an action that increases federal expenditures by almost a billion dollars,
but counts as deregulatory because it reduces the cost to doctors of
filling out paperwork to access federal benefits. The action is, in all
probability, perfectly reasonable. However, it is silly to consider it
part of a deregulatory agenda.
Without those twelve actions, we are left with only three major
deregulatory actions that qualify as “deregulatory” consistent with
the criteria outlined earlier. I will describe each rule in detail below.

c. The major Trump deregulatory acts that have taken effect. One
of the three major deregulatory acts changed the definition of an
“employer” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).114 Without getting into the technical details, the change
enables many more people to qualify for association health plans, which
are a lower-cost, lower-coverage alternative outside of the Affordable
Care Act. While clearly deregulatory in the sense of allowing citizens to
do something they could not do before, expanding the availability of
association health plans does not unambiguously reduce regulatory costs.
Indeed, the agency noted in the Federal Register, “On balance, deficit
increasing effects are likely to dominate, making the proposal’s net
111. Medicare Program; CY 2018 Updates to the Quality Payment Program; and Quality Payment Program: Extreme and Uncontrollable Circumstance Policy for the Transition
Year, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568, 53,569 (Nov. 16, 2017) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 414),
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2017-11-16/2017-24067.
112. Id. at 53,577.
113. Id.
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impact on the federal budget negative.”115 As for overall effects, the
agency could only state: “While the impacts of this proposed rule, and of
AHPs themselves, are intended to be positive on net, the incidence,
nature and magnitude of both positive and negative effects are
uncertain.”116 Since the agency proposing the rule does not itself feel
comfortable asserting specific regulatory cost savings from this
“deregulatory” action, it stands to reason we should not assign any.
The second of the three major deregulatory actions is the “Omnibus Essential Fish Habitat Amendment 2,” which allows greater
fishing in some areas off the shore of the northeastern United
States.117 The issuing agencies under the Department of Commerce
predicted annualized cost savings of $60 to $62 million.118 Some
commentators have pointed out that this rule simply adopted the
recommendations of the New England Fishery Management Council, which were issued in December 2016, before the Trump administration took office. Even if its genesis arguably predates the Trump
administration, the rule does reduce a classic regulatory burden: restriction of access to public land. We can consider it an actual deregulatory action.
The third of the three major deregulatory actions is probably the
most prominent: rescinding a 2016 regulation requiring greater capture of methane generated while drilling for oil on federal and Indian
lands.119 The cost savings from that rule depend slightly on perspective. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) stated that the action
would reduce compliance costs for energy companies by $1.32 to
$2.03 billion over ten years.120 BLM did not subtract from that figure
the value of the methane captured, which would directly accrue to
the entities bearing the regulatory burden. Sale of the methane captured under the rule was expected to produce $629 to $824 million
114. Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans,
83 Fed. Reg. 614 (Jan. 5, 2018) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
115. Id. at 632.
116. Id. at 626.
117. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries
of the Northeastern United States; Essential Fish Habitat, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,492 (Nov. 6, 2017)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
118. Id. at 51,497.
119. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018) (codified at
43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
120. Id. at 7939.
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over the same time span.121 If one subtracts the revenue accrued from
methane sales, the cost reduction is $496 million to $1.4 billion over
ten years. On an annualized basis, that amounts to $71 to $199 million. A deregulatory action, sure, but, like the fishing rule, one that
carries relatively minor cost savings.
From this review of OMB’s list of deregulatory actions, we derive
a sum total of “hard” savings of $131 to $261 million annually: $71 to
$199 million from repeal of the methane capture rule, and $60 to $62
million from the fisheries rule. If we generously date those rule
changes to the beginning of his administration, President Trump reduced “hard” regulatory costs by $262 to $522 million total by the
end of fiscal year 2018.122

3. Will major deregulatory actions currently under way dramatically
change the tally?
OMB’s fiscal year 2018 review covered only finalized actions, so
it is worth taking stock of major regulatory actions that have since
been finalized or will likely be finalized before the end of President
Trump’s first term. While those actions are not relevant for determining regulatory savings’ role in current economic growth because
they have not gone into effect, we should consider whether they
would meaningfully affect the overall estimation of Trump administration deregulation. Upon review, it is unlikely that these major
rules would significantly contribute to economic growth.

a. Clean Power Plan repeal and replacement. Some of the biggest
potential sources of regulatory savings present the most difficult
methodological issues: the Clean Power Plan (CPP) and the redefinition
of “waters of the United States” rule (WOTUS).
The CPP was finalized under President Obama in 2015, then
stayed in February 2016 by the Supreme Court.123 That litigation was
still ongoing when President Trump came into office.124 The D.C.
121. Id.
122. Assuming a 7% discount rate, as the Trump administration OMB does in its discounting calculations. See, e.g., id.
123. Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, (S. Ct. February 9, 2016) (No.
15A773), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/020916zr_21p3.pdf.
124. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent EPA in Support of Abeyance, West Virginia
v. EPA (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2017) (No. 15-1363), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
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Circuit essentially halted proceedings pending potential settlement.125
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) subsequently announced it would repeal the CPP and replace it with the Affordable
Clean Energy (ACE) plan.126 The EPA finalized the rule repealing
the CPP and replacing it with ACE on July 8, 2019, with ACE taking
effect on September 6, 2019.127 Both the repeal and the replacement
plan will likely be the subject of litigation, and the fate of both actions is unclear.
The extent to which the attempt to switch from CPP to ACE has
resulted in regulatory savings is very much in the eye of the beholder.
At the very least, even if the repeal and replace actions get stuck in
court until after Trump’s presidency, there are cost savings involved
in the absence of the CPP for four years. Against that logic, though
the CPP has not gone into effect yet, it is easy to envision a scenario
in which it does. To wit, legal challenges to both the repeal of the
CPP and the promulgation of ACE could be successful, and then the
EPA would be forced to keep the CPP. Or, if the courts do not issue
a final ruling before the 2020 elections, a new administration could
abandon the repeal and replace effort, allowing CPP to go into effect.
One aspect of the repeal and replace effort makes its immediate
effects easy to estimate. Under the ACE rule, states have three years
from September 6, 2019 to propose how they will comply with the
rule. The ACE rule has thus likely not caused any significant regulatory costs as of the publication of this article. At the same time, given
that the CPP never took effect, it is not clear that we should accord
any savings to the repeal effort. And, as stated earlier, the repeal effort might be derailed by lawsuits, or delayed until after the election
when another president might abandon the repeal. It is premature to
count any “savings” that may not materialize.

change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2017/20170515_docket-151363_brief-1.pdf.
125. See Order No. 15-1363, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017),
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2017/20170428_docket-15-1363_order.pdf.
126. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA.GOV, (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20181231222845/https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epaproposes-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule.
127. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/08/2019-13507/repeal-of-theclean-power-plan-emission-guidelines-for-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-existing.
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There can be “soft” cost savings from the repeal effort even if its
legal status remains in limbo. Companies presumably make investments to become compliant with the rule, perhaps before it is even
finalized. If a company were on the verge of investing to comply with
the CPP in November 2016, then canceled those investments after
the election of President Trump, that seems like paradigmatic savings
from deregulation. Those effects would be evident in our discussion
of “soft” benefits, so we need not consider them here.
Of course, speculation about avoided investments to comply with
regulation has a flip side as well. Companies that already made investments to comply with the CPP may have gained little or nothing
from the deregulation. Indeed, those companies may suffer as much
by the deregulation as the initial regulation if the investments in
compliance rendered them uncompetitive with other companies that
did not make similar investments.
While the net effect of these competing forces is unclear, in theory, the net effect of the potential repeal of the CPP would be counted
under the “soft” effects methodology, which will be discussed at
length later in this article.

b. Waters of the United States redefinition. WOTUS presents a
different issue: a rule that is partially in effect. The Obama
administration EPA issued a clarification of the term “waters of the
United States,” used in the Clean Water Act to describe EPA’s
jurisdiction to regulate water.128 Multiple lawsuits ensued.129 The rule
was stayed by a district court in August 2015, hours before it was to take
effect.130 The Trump administration proposed and finalized a rule
repealing the 2015 definition, and a rule replacing that would reduce the

128. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg.
37,054 (Jun. 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122,
230, 232, 300, 302, and 401), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/06/29/201513435/clean-water-rule-definition-of-waters-of-the-united-states.
129. See, e.g., Pam MacLean, Sixteen States Sue EPA over Clean Water Rule, REUTERS
(Jun. 29, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-environment-water-epa/sixteen-statessue-epa-over-clean-water-rule-idUSKCN0P92QJ20150629.
130. See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, North Dakota v. EPA (D. N.D. 2015), https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/north-dakota/nddce/3:2015cv00059/31173/70/0.pdf?ts=1440758970.
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scope of EPA’s jurisdiction.131 As of this writing, some states are still
governed by the pre-2015 standard, and some are governed by the 2015
standard.132
The crux of the WOTUS dilemma is whether to count deregulatory benefits from a rule that technically is in effect in some places
and not others. The intuitive “fair” answer would be to count the
benefits from undoing WOTUS in the states where it has gone into
effect and not to count the savings from states where it has not gone
into effect. EPA did not publish its cost-benefit analysis in a state-bystate breakdown, however, so this approach is easier to conceive than
to execute.
As of this drafting, WOTUS is in effect in 26 states, disproportionately states with smaller GDP.133 So, to the extent there are regulatory savings from the repeal effort, they would come from those
states.
Another methodologically messy aspect of the WOTUS repeal is
that the Trump administration argues states will regulate some of the
areas over which EPA would have had jurisdiction under the Obamaera WOTUS definition.134 If state regulators do not take up the slack,
the avoided costs of the WOTUS rule are much greater.
The two sources of uncertainty—application in some states and
not others, and how state regulators react to the withdrawal of EPA
jurisdiction—can be set against each other to create a rough but fair
estimate. We know the pre-2015 rule is already in effect in half of the
states, so the benefits of going back to the pre-2015 rule are zero for
them. We can thus reasonably choose EPA’s estimate for savings ac131. See Press Release, EPA, EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule, Ensuring
Reliable, Diversified Energy Resources while Protecting our Environment (Jun. 19, 2019),
EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ensuring-reliable-diversified-energy.
132. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”: Rule Status and Litigation Update,
EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/definition-waters-united-states-rule-status-and-litigation-update (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
133. Seven of the 10 largest states by GDP are not currently subject to WOTUS—
California, Texas, New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey. See LAURA GATZ,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45424, “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” (WOTUS):
CURRENT STATUS OF THE 2015 CLEAN WATER RULE (Dec. 12, 2018)., https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R45424.pdf.
134. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4201 (Feb.
14, 2019) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232,
300, 302, and 401). https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/revised
_definition_of_waters_of_the_united_states.pdf.
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cruing if most states do regulate the waters in question. The span of
EPA’s range of avoided costs is massive: $28 to $497 million.135 Hewing to the lower end of that range to compensate for states where the
Obama WOTUS never went into effect, we can select $100 million
in annual savings as a realistic if somewhat arbitrary choice. If the
WOTUS definition change survives court appeal, the cost reduction
contributed by this particular case would likely not dramatically
swing the overall estimate of deregulatory cost savings.

c. Outer continental shelf energy exploitation. On January 4, 2018,

the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) released a draft
proposal for outer-continental shelf development over the period 2019–
2024.136 That plan would partially replace an Obama-era plan for 2017–
2022.137 On its face, the plan opened up a wide array of new offshore
territory for oil and gas leases, most notably in the mid-Atlantic, off the
gulf coast, and off the Alaskan coast.138 However, BOEM has not yet
released a final proposal, and what areas will be opened for lease remains
unclear. For example, then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke
announced that Florida’s offshore areas would be exempted from oil and
gas leases, prompting calls for additional exemptions from many other
states.139
Even if the final plan sticks closely to the draft plan, it is still very
difficult to estimate the cost savings. There will only be “savings” if
the oil and gas industries actually lease the areas in question. The extent of subsequent exploitation is also an open question—most leases
are essentially left fallow, to be used only if the price of oil reaches a
certain level. For example, in the western Gulf of Mexico, as of April
2019, there were 310 active leases, but only fifty-eight of them were

135.
136.

Id.

BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., NATIONAL OCS OIL AND GAS LEASING
PROGRAM, https://www.boem.gov/National-OCS-Program/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
137. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2017–2022 OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM (2016), https://www.boem.gov/
2017-2022-OCS-Oil-and-Gas-Leasing-PFP/.
138. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2019–2024 NATIONAL OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM (2018),
https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024/.
139. See Ryan Zinke (@SecretaryZinke), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:20 PM),
https://twitter.com/secretaryzinke/status/950870010242719745?lang=en; Pamela King, States
Call for the Fla. Treatment in their case against drilling, E&E News (Jan. 18, 2018).
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actually producing oil or gas.140 That decision will depend on the current and expected future price of oil and natural gas. As of this writing, offshore leases under Trump have actually yielded less revenue
than lease sales under Obama, a fact largely attributable to lower oil
prices under Trump and more easily recoverable resources onshore
in recent years.141
There is also a significant chance that some or all of the proposed
plan will be blocked in court as arbitrary and capricious. Secretary
Zinke seemed to announce the exemption of Florida by tweet, citing
then-Governor Rick Scott’s leadership: “As a result of discussion with
Governor Scott’s [sic] and his leadership, I am removing Florida
from consideration for any new oil and gas platforms.”142 That explanation drew immediate suggestion that decisions not to exempt other
areas would lead to lawsuits alleging an arbitrary and capricious process of granting exemptions.143
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to offer a reasonable
guess as to the regulatory cost savings from the Trump administration’s plan to open up more area for leasing. It seems safe to assume
that opening more areas for drilling will not cause regulatory costs to
go up, but whether they go down and by how much is essentially impossible to determine. In any event, the proposed plan has not been
finalized, and given the low price of oil, it is unlikely that the additional available land will significantly affect total regulatory savings.

d. Opening up land for energy exploration. The Trump
administration has made opening onshore land for oil and gas
production a top priority, which has had a significant effect on
production. BLM reported $358 million in revenue from oil and gas
leases in 2017, representing an 86% increase from 2016.144 In 2018, that
140. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT, COMBINED LEASING REPORT (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.boem.gov/Combined-Leasing-Statistics-April-2019/.
141. Nichola Groom, U.S. Gulf Oil, Gas Lease Sale Sees Higher Interest from Drillers,
KITCO NEWS, (Mar. 20, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.kitco.com/news/2019-03-20/U-S-Gulfoil-gas-lease-sale-sees-higher-interest-from-drillers.html.
142. Ryan Zinke (@SecretaryZinke), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/SecretaryZinke/status/950876846698180608.
143. Umair Irfan, Florida Got an Exemption to the Offshore Drilling Plan, VOX (Jan. 12,
2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/1/10/16870450/ocsoffshore-drilling-oil-gas-lease-zinke-florida.
144. Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM Oil and Gas Lease Sales Generate $360 Million in
2017, WWW.BLM.GOV, (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-oil-and-gas-
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figure shot up another 205% to $1.1 billion.145 That figure is just the
federal share of the benefits.
It is possible to make a rough calculation of private sector benefits from these actions. The Department of the Interior released a report in fiscal year 2017 stating that oil, gas, and coal production on
federal lands and waters generated $67.22 billion in direct economic
contributions.146 Of that total, roughly three-quarters are from onshore production.147 The leased area that produced that value was
25.7 million acres.148 Put another way, the leased area produced about
$2,600 per acre leased. The Trump administration’s lease sales were
for about 793,000 acres in 2017 and 1.5 million acres in 2018.149 If we
assume equal productivity from existing and new federal leased areas,
the 2017 and 2018 sales generated $2.1 billion and $3.9 billion respectively.
That is not, however, the end of the calculation. From that total,
we should subtract the average annual newly leased acreage under the
Obama administration. The regulatory “burden” relieved by the
Trump administration through the lease sales is the newly leased land
beyond what the Obama administration would have leased anyway.
The average BLM annual lease sale from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal
year 2016 was 1.35 million acres, comparable to Trump administration leases in either 2017 or 2018.150
Another complication is pending lawsuits. A federal court has already frozen 300,000 acres leased under the Trump administration in
Wyoming. The judge in that case ruled that the sale was arbitrary
and capricious because the Trump administration did not take into

lease-sales-generate-360-million-2017.
145. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Energy Revolution Unleashed: Interior Shatters Previous Records with $1.1 Billion in 2018 Oil and Gas Lease Sales (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.doi.gov/news/energy-revolution-unleashed-interior-shatters-previous-records-11billion-2018-oil-and-gas.
146. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ECONOMIC REPORT FY 2017, 11 (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/fy_2017_econ_report_final_11_1_18.pdf.
147. See MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42432, U.S. CRUDE OIL AND
NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL AREAS 3 (2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42432.
148. Id. at 9.
149. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 146.
150. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OIL AND GAS STATISTICS tbl.4,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics
(last
visited Aug. 8, 2018).
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account the effect of the carbon released through expanded use of oil
and gas.151 300,000 acres is actually larger than the difference between the average newly leased acreage under Obama (1.35 million
acres) and the 1.5 million acres leased by Trump in 2018. We are
thus in the bizarre situation where the slipshod manner of the Trump
administration’s deregulatory action could actually mean that the net
regulatory burden increased.
All these data points dampen the potential deregulatory impact of
the land leases. If we simply ignore the litigation hold on the 300,000
acres, the impact of the additional lease sales under President Trump
was something like $650 million in 2018.
The above analysis suggests that, at $650 million, increased federal land leases are one of the largest sources of deregulatory cost savings under President Trump. However, this amount is still an incremental increase in deregulatory savings, not an economic gamechanger. Furthermore, if the theory of regulatory burden in this case
is that perfectly good land was available for lease but held back because of regulatory caprice, it stands to reason that such land will decline in quantity as the Trump administration proceeds. We should
therefore expect that the cost savings will not be $650 million every
year.152

151. Juliet Eilperin, Federal Judge Demands Trump Administration Reveal How Its
Drilling Plans Will Fuel Climate Change, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:27 AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/03/20/federal-judge-casts-doubttrumps-drilling-plans-across-us-because-they-ignore-climate-change/.
152. The price of oil and gas will have a much larger impact on these benefits than the
amount of land leased. A considerable portion of leased land is not productive every year precisely because it is only economical to work that land at certain oil prices. See HUMPHRIES,
supra note 147, at 9 (showing about half of leased onshore land is not productive).
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e. Freezing CAFE standards. In July 2018, the National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration and EPA proposed freezing Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and carbon dioxide standards for
passenger cars and light trucks for model years 2021 through 2026.153
They issued a joint draft regulatory impact analysis for the proposed
rule.154
If the proposed rule goes into effect and the agencies’ draft cost
estimates are taken at face value, freezing CAFE and CO2 standards
is the single most consequential act in the deregulatory agenda by a
vast margin. The agencies project annualized cost savings of $19.2 to
$24.2 billion.155
As with other non-finalized rules, there are a number of reasons
to discount the significance of these projects. First, the rule has not
been finalized and is not in effect, so these projections do not help us
explain the current economic boom. Second, even if the rule were finalized, the significant savings would not start kicking in until 2021,
at which point President Trump might no longer be in office.156
As with other major rules not yet in effect, a future administration could change the rules again. A court could also overturn the
rule, as with the other examples discussed above. There is even a
strong possibility that states like California will institute their own
CAFE-like standards.157 Because of the size of the California market,
manufacturers might be forced to follow those standards, undoing
most of the cost savings anticipated by the federal rule.158
This is most likely the rule where only considering regulatory
costs and ignoring benefits gives the most skewed perspective. CAFE

153. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL EFFICIENT (SAFE)
VEHICLES
PROPOSED
RULE
FOR
MODEL
YEARS
2021-2026,
EPA.GOV,
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/safer-affordable-fuelefficient-safe-vehicles-proposed (last updated Sept. 27, 2018).
154. NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN. & U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, THE SAFER
AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021-2026
PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS (July 2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ld_cafe_my2021-26_pria_0.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L HIGHWAY
SAFETY ADMIN.].
155. Id. at 13.
156. See id. at 33. Note that the standards are unaffected until 2021.
157. Coral Davenport, Automakers Plan for Their Worst Nightmare: Regulatory Chaos
After Trump’s Emissions Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/10/climate/auto-emissions-cafe-rollback-trump.html.
158. See id.
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standards have a vast impact because they relate to most automobile
purchases in a country that buys around $80 billion in cars a
month.159 As with the tweaks to Medicare transfer rules discussed earlier, the sheer volume of trade being regulated means small “deregulatory” acts will carry an outsized effect. Thus, even a small tweak to
CAFE standards will have a vast effect on regulatory costs.
The real distortion here comes from looking at costs and not
benefits of regulation. While every regulation we have discussed has
benefits, in the paradigmatic regulatory case, the costs are mostly
monetary, and the benefits come in the form of health improvements
or the like. CAFE standards, by contrast, have an obvious immediate
economic benefit: lowering fuel costs for consumers.160 The regulation has some deadweight loss because consumers might not want
more fuel-efficient cars. However, a large portion of the costs and
benefits are simply a tradeoff between increased cost of cars and increased cost of fuel.
To more clearly illustrate that phenomenon, imagine a situation
where there are two possible building materials for the $1 billion water bottle market: plastic and steel. Assume consumers are essentially
indifferent between the two such that without regulation, the market
is 50% plastic bottles, 50% steel bottles. Then imagine EPA issues a
regulation banning plastic water bottles because it is discovered that
the plastic causes cancer. Even ignoring the health benefits, the costs
and benefits are essentially equal. Assume further that former plastic
consumers smoothly transition to steel, and steel manufacturers hire
the workers who formerly made plastic bottles.
This scenario highlights the slipperiness of “regulatory burden”
as a concept. There are winners and losers, but the economy overall
is not harmed. However, in our exercise of only counting regulatory
costs, it appears that this regulation had a $500 million cost. To distill the essence of the problem, when a regulation is essentially just
the government forcing a move along the Pareto frontier (i.e., moving from one state of maximum utility to a different but equal in utility state), examining only the regulatory costs will mislead as to the
159. See RETAIL SALES: AUTOMOBILE DEALERS, FRED, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MRTSSM4411USN (last updated Mar. 17, 2020).
160. There are, of course, other benefits to CAFE standards, e.g., lower CO2 emissions.
That sort of benefit is more typical of an ordinary regulation, where the public at large accrues
the benefits in a less direct way than straightforward lower costs.
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actual importance of the regulation. The more a regulation resembles
this situation, the more misleading the costs-only approach will be.
As applied to President Trump’s proposed CAFE standards, annualized cost savings are $19.2 to $24.2 billion, but net annualized
savings are only $6.7 to $9.5 billion.161 If the proposed CAFE standards end up going into effect, those savings would still be larger than
all the finalized deregulatory actions to date, but the savings are not
hugely significant in the context of the overall economy.
Ultimately, we cannot count the CAFE and CO2 standards toward regulatory benefits of the administration thus far because the
rules are not finalized and have not gone into effect. Indeed, California recently reached an agreement with the automotive industry on a
different set of standards that would render the new federal CAFE
and CO2 standards moot.162 However, the case raises methodological
questions that cast uncertainty on the relatively large potential regulatory savings of this purported deregulation victory.163

f. Tariffs: non-traditional additions to the “regulatory burden”?

If one were to define the “regulatory burden,” a perfectly serviceable
definition might be “the cost of requirements on the private sector
imposed by the executive branch without congressional
involvement.” Tariffs seem to fit that definition perfectly well, as
they impose an obligation to pay additional money to purchase goods
from certain providers. In practice, businesses may end up uprooting
existing business arrangements to avoid the tariff, the sort of activity
usually considered a cost of regulation.
Most traditional accounting of regulatory costs do not include
tariffs. A plausible reason for the omission is that a tariff seems more
like a tax than a regulation. Historically, tariffs were used more for
NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 154, at 13.
See Shannon Van Sant, California Signs Deal with Automakers to Produce FuelEfficient Cars, NPR (Jul. 25, 2019, 9:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/745389326
/california-signs-deal-with-automakers-to-produce-fuel-efficient-cars.
163. Among other things, experts question the assertion that freezing CAFE standards
will result in 6 million fewer cars being on the road by 2029. See, e.g., Jessica McDonald, The
FACTCHECK.ORG
(May
3,
2019),
Facts
on
Fuel
Economy
Standards,
https://www.factcheck.org/2019/05/the-facts-on-fuel-economy-standards/. Other studies claim
that the NHTSA ignored 6 million used cars, and that incorporating those cars into the calculations wipe out the supposed benefits of the new rules. Rules to Boost Fuel Economy for Vehicles Will Do More Good Than Harm, New Study Shows, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://phys.org/news/2018-12-boost-fuel-economy-vehicles-good.html.
161.
162.
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their revenue-generating capacity than as a method to regulate the
economy. In the Trump administration, however, tariffs are frequently framed as a “trade war” and used as a means to alter the
economy, specifically to increase the domestically produced share in
markets ranging from solar panels to dairy products. It is difficult to
come up with a substantive, non-formalistic reason not to consider
tariffs as a form of regulation in this context.
Practically, most assessments of regulatory burden probably do
not include tariffs because under current law, the executive branch
does not need to produce a detailed regulatory impact analysis for
new tariffs like it has to for proposed rules. Without a formal federal
analysis, we must rely on outside sources, which can be biased or use
shoddy methodology. Still, as discussed below, the range of estimates
established by academic and industry sources suggest the costs of the
trade war far outstrip the savings due to deregulation.
Two National Bureau of Economic Research papers have assessed the costs of the trade war as $7.2 billion and $16.8 billion annually.164 One assessment of the U.S.-China trade war cited in the
New York Times estimated that current planned tariffs on both sides
of the trade war would reduce U.S. GDP growth by 0.3% annually,
or roughly $64 billion.165 Reuters described the consensus estimate of
direct U.S. losses from the trade war thus far as 0.1–0.2% of GDP,
which would amount to $21 to $43 billion annually.166
A caveat to this line of reasoning is that the losses cited above do
not discriminate between losses due to U.S. tariffs and losses due to
Chinese tariffs. However, it seems fair to note that the Trump administration started the current trade war, and retaliatory tariffs are

164. Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et. al, The Return to Protectionism (NBER, Working Paper
No. 25638, 2019) (estimating $7.2 billion in aggregate real income loss); Mary Amiti et. al.,
The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare (NBER, Working Paper No.
25672, 2019) (estimating $1.4 billion in monthly cost).
165. Peter S. Goodman, The Global Economy Was Improving. Then the Fighting Resumed., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/us-chinatrade-war-economy.html (estimating 0.3% annual GDP loss); U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS,
GROSS
DOMESTIC
PRODUCT,
BEA
20–07,
(2019),
https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019second-estimate [hereinafter BEA 2019 ESTIMATE] (estimating 2019 GDP at $21.429 trillion).
166. Marius Zaharia, Explainer: Counting the Cost of the U.S.-China Trade War So
Far, REUTERS (May 6, 2019, 3:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-chinaexplainer/explainer-counting-the-cost-of-the-u-s-china-trade-war-so-far-idUSKCN1SC0N2;
BEA 2019 ESTIMATE, supra note 165 (estimating 2019 GDP at $21.429 trillion).
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reasonably foreseeable costs to imposing tariffs. The administration
undoubtedly thought the benefits would outweigh the costs, but that
is precisely the rationale for regulation offered by every president,
and we are only tallying costs in this exercise. Additional tariffs have
been imposed on steel, aluminum, solar panels, and washing machines.
Even taking the low end of the estimate range, the regulatory
burden imposed by tariffs is larger than the most sanguine estimates
of “hard” deregulatory cost savings by the Trump administration.

B. Estimating “Soft” Effects of Deregulation
While it is relatively easy to examine “hard” estimates of cost savings from deregulation, those estimates could never plausibly account
for major macroeconomic effects on the economy. To find some aspect of deregulation that could act on a macroeconomic level, we
need to estimate the “soft” savings—the economic effect of the decreased expectation of regulation driven by the executive branch.
That decreased expectation could arise from the specific deregulatory
acts described above as well as by simple rhetoric. For example, President Trump has mentioned “deregulation” or criticized excessive
regulation sixty-three times to date on Twitter during his presidency.167 The decreased expectation of regulation could in theory lead to
increased investment, increased entrepreneurship, and decreased
marginal compliance costs (e.g., hiring one less in-house compliance
lawyer).
A full examination of the relevant data shows no strong evidence
for the existence of “soft” effects that can be distinguished from
broader economic trends. There was an increase in business investment in 2017 that was slightly more pronounced in the United States
than Europe, but not significantly so, and to detect any difference
one must choose the right date range. In the two months following
President Trump’s election, business confidence increased more in
Europe than in the United States. Without evidence of unique “soft”
deregulatory benefits in the United States, and keeping in mind the
167. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 2, 2019, 9:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1123987855053873154;
Donald
Trump
(@realDonaldrump), TWITTER (Aug 7, 2017, 4:09 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonald
trump/status/894515865802223616.
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evidence of significant state and judicial pushback, there is a strong
case for assessing “soft” deregulatory benefits under the Trump administration as almost zero.

1. Lack of clear evidence on a general slowdown in regulation
Before embarking on an empirical approach to estimating “soft”
effects, we should discuss the difficulty of proving a general slowdown in regulation in the first place. Intuitively, it seems obvious that
there has been a regulatory slowdown under President Trump, a
claim enthusiastically made by both the President’s supporters and
detractors.168 Surprisingly, a closer look reveals that the evidence is
somewhat equivocal. CEI, the entity that issued the “Tip of the
Costberg” report discussed at length earlier in this article, hosted a
congratulatory blog post on the Trump administration’s 2018 deregulatory efforts.169 The perceived success highlighted in the post relied
on the number of discrete rules and the total pages printed in the
Federal Register in each year. To its credit, CEI noted the ways in
which page counts and discrete rules do not directly measure regulatory burden.170 Other methods focus on the use of imperative language, i.e., how often words like “shall” appear.171
While it is worthwhile to attempt to measure regulatory burden,
these methods are, at best, rudimentary. At worst, they are meaningless. There is no reason the repeal of a given rule (i.e., a deregulatory
action) would be shorter in word or page count than the original
adoption, especially if the rule is relatively old. And if, as is often the
case, the original rule is being replaced by a less restrictive rule (e.g.,
the CPP repeal), the new rule will logically have a similar or identical
168. See, e.g., David L. Bahnsen, Sometimes Trump: Now More Than Ever, NAT’L
REV., (July 30, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/sometimes-donaldtrump-now-more-than-ever/ (crediting “the sweeping efforts at deregulation” of the Trump
administration for the state of the economy).
169. Clyde Wayne Crews, Trump’s 2018 Deregulatory Effort: 3,367 Rules, 68,082 Pages, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://cei.org/blog/trumps-2018deregulatory-effort-3367-rules-68082-pages.
170. Among other reasons, there is no inherent reason to expect a different page count
for a deregulatory action, a moderately strict regulatory action, and a very strict regulatory action. Since each deregulatory action is a “rule,” simply counting rules is also misleading. In addition, of course, one massively expensive rule can easily outweigh a hundred smaller rules.
171. See, e.g., Patrick McLaughlin, Regulatory Data on Trump’s First Year, MERCATUS
CTR. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-data-trump-first-year.
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amount of imperative language. A simple example: “the limit on particulate matter shall be 1 part per billion” and “the limit on particular
matter shall be 0.1 parts per billion” would show up as identical in
the methodologies described above despite the latter being 90% less
restrictive.
Statistics aside, while the Trump administration has clearly proposed (but not necessarily put into effect) many deregulatory acts that
a Hillary Clinton administration would not have proposed, it is difficult to determine evidence to support this assumption. It is easy to
observe that the Trump administration advocates for more deregulation than the Clinton administration likely would have. It is far more
difficult to identify specific rules the Clinton administration would
have issued that the Trump administration has not. The Obama administration had already acted in areas like climate change, CAFE
standards, WOTUS, etc. What other major rules would the Clinton
Administration have pushed?
The clearest example of a new issue where a different administration may have pursued a different course is EPA regulation of per and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Used primarily for firefighting,
PFAS chemicals have been found to contaminate drinking water.
PFAS creates birth defects; affects growth, learning, and behavior of
infants; increases risk of cancer; and increases cholesterol levels.172
Researchers have indicated that there are PFAS-contaminated sites in
forty-three states.173
Democrats have alleged that the Trump EPA is not moving fast
enough to create drinking water standards for PFAS.174 The Obamaera EPA recommended that water should not contain more than seventy parts per trillion of PFAS and similar chemicals, but the Trump-

172. See Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) and Your Health, AGENCY FOR
TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/pfas/health-effects.html
(last updated Jan. 21, 2020); Zeyan Liew et. al, Developmental Exposures to Perfluoroalkyl
Substances (PFASs): An Update of Associated Health Outcomes, U.S. National Library of
Medicine (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6348874/.
173. Brian Pascus, New Study Claims 43 States Expose Millions to Dangerous Chemical
in Drinking Water, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drinkingwater-may-contain-pfas-chemicals-in-43-states-according-to-new-study-by-environmentalworking-group/.
174. Rebecca Beitsch, Lawmakers, Trump Agencies Set for Clash Over Chemicals in
Water, THE HILL (May 27, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/445514lawmakers-trump-agencies-set-for-clash-over-chemicals-in-water.
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era EPA has yet to take action.175 We might guess that a Clinton administration would have been more likely to act on PFAS. PFAS regulation is thus a plausible area where the Trump administration may
be saving regulatory costs. It is, however, impossible to say exactly
what savings there might be from lax PFAS regulation. Obviously,
the Trump EPA may still act, which introduces inherent uncertainty.
It seems unlikely that PFAS regulatory costs would be hugely significant, let alone that the difference in Trump and Clinton EPA regulatory costs would be substantial. A much more profound uncertainty
arises from the fact that the Trump EPA’s inaction is leading states to
regulate PFAS on their own.176 If Trump administration inaction
leads individual states to impose stricter regulations than the Clinton
administration would have, it is entirely possible that PFAS regulatory costs could end up higher under the Trump administration than
they would have been under a Clinton administration.

2. The case for “soft” effects of deregulation
There is a widespread assumption among both policy professionals and the public at large that regulation has decreased under President Trump.177 Many policy professionals argue that the Trump administration has not actually reversed many Obama-era rules, but
rather, that the slowing of new rules is making a major difference.178
175. See U.S. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: PFOA & PFOS DRINKING WATER
HEALTH ADVISORIES, (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents
/drinkingwaterhealthadvisories_pfoa_pfos_updated_5.31.16.pdf.
176. See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, States Aren’t Waiting for the Trump Administration on Environmental Protections, WASH. POST (May 19, 2019, 5:14 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/states-arent-waiting-for-the-trumpadministration-on-environmental-protections/2019/05/19/5dc853fc-7722-11e9-b3f55673edf2d127_story.html.
177. See, e.g., Government, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/27286/government
.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).
178. See, e.g., New Report Grades Trump Record on Deregulation, AM. COUNCIL FOR
CAP. FORMATION (Mar. 13, 2019), http://accf.org/2019/03/13/new-report-grades-trumprecord-on-deregulation/ (“The flow of new regulations has diminished significantly in President Trump’s first two years in office. . . .”); see also Danny Vinik, Under Trump, Regulation
Slows to a Crawl, POLITICO (June 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/
2017/06/07/trump-regulation-slowdown-000446. (“The ‘two-for-one’ order, signed January
30, applies only to ‘significant’ regulations with an economic impact exceeding $100 million or
meeting other specified criteria, and it may be working in a counterintuitive way: Although it
was touted as a way to roll back old rules, its main impact appears to be simply erecting obstacles to new regulations.”).
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The empirical case for this phenomenon rests on two points: (1)
there has been a significant increase in business investment under
President Trump, and (2) the increase is not solely due to other factors such as the tax cuts enacted into law at the end of 2017. From a
comparison of the evolution of business investment in the U.S. and
the European Union over 2017 in particular, one could make the case
for as much as $58 billion in annual increased investment from deregulation.

a. Increase in gross business investment. One would expect that a

decrease in regulation would spur entrepreneurship, and the data does
indicate increased business formation since the 2016 election. From the
fourth quarter of 2016 to the first quarter of 2019, seasonally adjusted
quarterly business formation increased from 74,288 to 78,130, having
peaked in the first quarter of 2018 at 81,960.179
Gross business investment has similarly increased significantly
under President Trump, from a seasonally adjusted annual rate of
$3.246 trillion at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2016 to
$3.783 trillion at the end of the fourth quarter in 2018.180 That difference, $537 billion, provides a convenient rough limit on how
much Trump deregulation could have helped the economy.181 That
figure obviously dwarfs the hard estimates of regulatory savings discussed above, which topped out at about $1 billion.

b. Accounting for the 2017 tax cuts and non-deregulatory factors.

Of course, even a partisan Trump supporter could not reasonably claim
all of that increase is due to deregulation. According to nonpartisan
studies, the 2017 tax cuts resulted in a decrease in annual tax revenue of
about $164 billion.182 Over the course of 2018, business investment
increased by $254 billion.183 However, the tax cuts did not take effect

179. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, GROSS PRIVATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GPDI [hereinafter FED. RESERVE BANK].
180. Id.
181. Private domestic investment would not, of course, include agency regulatory savings
(i.e., the lower cost to the agencies of enforcing fewer rules or of lessening enforcement of existing rules), but those are so small compared to $537 billion that they can be safely ignored.
182. Howard Gleckman, The Price of Tax Cuts and Spending Hikes, TAX POLICY CTR.
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/price-tax-cuts-and-spending-hikes.
183. FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179.
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until the first quarter of 2018,184 so we can at least somewhat isolate
deregulatory effects by examining investment increases from the fourth
quarter of 2016 (measured October 1, 2016, roughly five weeks before
the election) through the fourth quarter of 2017. Over that period, gross
business investment increased by $296 billion.185

Fig. 1—U.S. quarterly gross private domestic investment;
highlighted section is fourth quarter 2016 through fourth quarter 2017.

What share of that increase can be plausibly attributed to deregulation? Obviously, the global economy has so many influences that
truly isolating the role of deregulation is practically impossible.
However, we can make a reasoned guess by comparing U.S. economic performance to that of the European Union, a similarly sized firstworld economy.186 While business investment was increasing in the
United States, it was also increasing in the European Union, which
was not in the midst of a particular deregulatory push.187
184.
185.
186.

Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, Title I, Sec. 111001(a), 115 Stat. 2054.
FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179.
See generally WORLD BANK, GDP (CURRENT US$) - EUROPEAN UNION,
UNITED STATES, CHINA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU-US-CN (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
187. Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
REGULATORY POLICY OUTLOOK 2018, EUROPEAN UNION, https://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/9789264303072en/1/2/7/11/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/9789264303072en&_csp_=46cd5ed37844c9dc6cf21c84716ab307&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#in

386

333]

Deregulation Defanged

As measured by the OECD, investment increased by 4% in the
United States in 2017, and 3.1% in the European Union.188 Because
we are seeking the maximum possible estimate, we will ascribe the
entire difference between U.S. and E.U. business investment in that
year to “soft” deregulatory effects. With that assumption, about 23%
of the $296 billion increase in U.S. business investment can be attributed to deregulation. That corresponds to about $68 billion over
five quarters, or an annualized increase of $54 billion.

3. The evidence against “soft” deregulatory effects under Trump.
There are broadly two categories of evidence against “soft” deregulatory effects under Trump: data suggesting the increase in business investment was due to factors other than deregulation, and data
suggesting that actual deregulation under President Trump has been
less substantive than one would expect. One would expect “soft” effects to arise from the collective experience of regulated companies,
and if the individuals at those companies do not actually see changes
in regulation, it is less likely that they would change their behavior
(i.e., increase business investment) in response to the deregulatory
agenda. These considerations suggest that “soft” effects are likely
negligible.

a. Business investment increases under Trump are almost exactly
ordinary. From the fourth quarter 2016 through the fourth quarter

2017, gross business investment increased on average 1.7% per
quarter.189 While this represents a solid increase, it is not particularly
remarkable. If we zoom out to examine all gross private domestic
investment figures since 1947, the average is almost exactly the growth
seen under President Trump: 1.8% quarterly.190 Recent presidents have
not deviated substantially from that trend. Average gross business

dicator-d1e17930 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) (describing a push toward better regulation that
began in 2015).
188. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTMENT (GFCF), https://data.oecd.org/gdp/investment-gfcf.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2020).
189. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, NET DOMESTIC INVESTMENT: PRIVATE:
DOMESTIC BUSINESS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W790RC1Q027SBEA (last visited
Mar. 2, 2020).
190. FED. RESERVE BANK, supra note 179.
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investment increase under President Obama was 1.6%t per quarter.191
The 0.1% difference is entirely due to the first two quarters under
President Obama, when investment was still decreasing in the aftermath
of the 2008 financial crisis. If those first two quarters are omitted,
President Obama’s average is 2.0%. It is difficult to see a deregulatory
benefits increase when business investment increase was essentially
unchanged.
Another way to look at the data is to see how often, over five consecutive quarters, business investment performed similarly under
President Obama to how it did under President Trump in 2017.
There were twenty-seven periods of five consecutive quarters in
President Obama’s presidency, excluding the last quarter, where the
supposed soft effects of Trump’s election would have started. Of the
twenty-seven possible sets of five quarters, twenty-one saw growth
higher than the first five quarters under President Trump.192 Put another way, business investment growth under President Trump during the likeliest period for “soft” deregulatory benefits would have
been an unusually slow period of business investment growth under
President Obama.
One more point from business investment data: one of the clearest predictors of a large increase in business investment in any given
quarter is a decrease in the quarters preceding it.193 Business investment was down throughout much of 2016. Ergo, it would be reasonable to expect that under any president, business investment would
have increased in 2017.

b. Business confidence is not disproportionately higher in the
United States than in Europe. A number of observers have suggested

that business confidence has increased under Trump, and data from the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
bears this out.194 However, business confidence increased slightly more
in OECD countries in Europe than in the United States during the

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Since 2010, there has not been more than two consecutive quarters of decreasing
gross private domestic investment.
194. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BUSINESS
CONFIDENCE INDEX (BCI) [hereinafter OECD, BCI], https://data.oecd.org/leadind/businessconfidence-index-bci.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
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Trump administration to date, and both started decreasing significantly
around October 2018.195 The chart below shows the time period of our
particular interest, November 2016 to January 1, 2018, plus some
context before and after. OECD adjusts this data so that 100 is the longrun historical average, and the U.S. was almost exactly at its historical
average in November 2016. Note that the beginning of the increase in
U.S. business confidence predates President Trump’s election by about
two months. Business confidence in the European OECD countries
increased 0.97 points from December 2016 to December 2017, and rose
by 0.96 points in the U.S.196

Fig. 2 —OECD monthly business confidence index.
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The correlation coefficient between Europe’s and the United
States’ business confidence in the OECD data is about 0.52 dating
back to December 1976.197 That falls between a medium-strength
and a strong association. While business confidence in the United
States and Europe can move in different directions at different
speeds, they tend to stay relatively close to one another.
195. Id. OECD countries generally comprise the larger, wealthier countries in Europe.
See “Member countries”, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/.
196. OECD, BCI supra note 194.
197. OECD, BCI supra note 194. Pearson correlation coefficient calculated by Excel us-

ing OECD data.
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If the maximum benefits scenario were in fact happening, we
would probably expect Europe and the United States to diverge
somewhat in business confidence. It makes sense that booming business from deregulation would spill over to Europe somewhat, but it is
improbable that the Europeans would be precisely as enthused about
their economic outlook as the United States. While economic growth
is not zero-sum, if nothing else, European manufacturers would suffer somewhat in the short run from the success of their U.S. competitors. Confounding outside factors could lead to this evidence, however, and there is an increase in business confidence in the United
States at the time we are most concerned about. It is thus possible
that business confidence could be about the same in the United
States and Europe when a huge deregulation-led boom is happening
in the United States, but it seems unlikely.

c. Enforcement of existing regulations not obviously lower than it
might have been under Clinton. We have so far considered only the

effect of explicitly changing rules through formal agency rulemaking.
However, one could imagine a lack of enforcement by regulators as
constituting de facto deregulation. Various cabinet officials have seemed
to signal this sort of approach, perhaps best exemplified by former EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt.198 EPA’s annual inspections and evaluations
reached a 21st-century low of 10,612 in 2018.199
However, when one examines enforcement data from the EPA,
the enforcement story becomes less clear. The EPA’s annual inspections and evaluations had been consistently trending downward since
2012.200 Civil penalties against polluters hit a twenty-five-year low in
2018, but 2017 saw the second-highest level of civil penalties over
that same time period.201 Civil and criminal cases initiated by the
EPA under President Trump were also lower than in Obama’s years,
but not radically so.202 The value of pollution control expenditures
198. Abigail Tracy, E.P.A. Purges Scientist, Plans to Replace them with Industry Reps,
VANITY FAIR (May 8, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/epa-scott-pruittscientists-dismissed.
199. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, LESS ENFORCEMENT: COMMUNITIES
AT RISK 1 (2019) [hereinafter EIP], http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/02/EIP-Enforcement-Report.pdf.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 3.
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required by consent decree plummeted in 2018, but was at near record-high levels in 2017.203
Data can, of course, mislead. There is a plethora of accounts of
the Trump-era EPA declining to prosecute offenders. It may be that
the EPA is enforcing existing rules selectively, essentially running up
the score on small offenders while letting larger offenders off the
hook.
The reasonable conclusion to draw from the anecdotal and data
evidence is that it is not clear whether deregulation by lack of enforcement is happening, at least at the EPA. Lack of enforcement
would be an unwieldy way to accrue regulatory benefits, particularly
because firms cannot reasonably plan on lack of enforcement so long
as some enforcement actions are taking place.

d. Judicial review is weakening the deregulatory effort. A rule can
be finalized and go into effect only to be overturned by judicial review.
In the context of analyzing reductions to the “regulatory burden,” we
obviously should not count deregulatory acts that are overturned by the
courts.204 Every administration faces the problem of judicial review, but
it has proven particularly irksome to Trump administration
environmental deregulatory actions.
Many observers have offered anecdotal analyses suggesting the
Trump administration is losing arbitrary and capricious review court
cases more often than the Obama administration did.205 I decided to
check that common assumption with an empirical review. I reviewed
323 cases from the Trump and Obama administrations involving a
ruling on whether a proposed EPA or Department of the Interior
(DOI) rule was arbitrary and capricious.206 Trump’s DOI won 69%
203. Id. at 4.
204. There could be savings from deregulatory actions overturned by judicial review if
enforcement of the rule is stayed while the case is ongoing. Those savings would likely be marginal because the regulated entities cannot rely on the regulation being repealed. They might
be able to delay investments in compliance, but that would merely “save” the interest on the
funds that otherwise would have been spent earlier.
205. See, e.g., Fred Barbash and Deanna Paul, The real reason the Trump administration
is constantly losing in court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-incourt/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html.
206. I chose EPA and DOI because both engage in the kind of environmental rulemakings that are paradigmatic of the “regulatory burden.” DOI’s ambit is far larger than EPA’s,
including, among other things, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and oversight of fisheries.
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of cases and Obama’s won 59%. However, Obama’s EPA won 70%
of its cases. As of May 12, 2019, Trump’s EPA has won only 50%.
Of course, the dividing line between the presidencies blurs
somewhat because court cases lag behind administrations. Thus,
many of the cases in 2017 related to rules that originated in the
Obama administration. As time has worn on, the Trump administration has won fewer cases. Across both agencies, the Trump administration won two-thirds of its arbitrary and capricious cases in 2017,
slightly less than that in 2018, and only 50% in 2019 to date.
Overall, the Trump administration does not necessarily have any
more severe a judicial review problem than previous administrations.
However, environmental rules specifically are less likely to survive
judicial review under President Trump than under President Obama.
Because environmental rules constitute a large portion of potential
deregulatory savings, deregulatory savings are likely to be lower in
the long-run than they appear at first glance. The EPA under Administrator Pruitt endured anecdotal criticism for ineffectiveness, partially because major deregulatory efforts were overturned by judicial review.207
The legal troubles of the deregulatory efforts are already baked
into the estimate of “hard” deregulatory savings. However, given that
legal troubles seem to be getting worse as the Trump administration
continues, judicial review is an independent reason to further discount the potential savings of major non-finalized actions such as the
repeal and replacement of the CPP, the redefinition of WOTUS,
and the freezing of CAFE and CO2 standards for cars.

207. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, The Myth of Scott Pruitt’s EPA Rollback, POLITICO
(Apr.
7,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/07/scott-pruitt-epaaccomplishments-rollback-217834.
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e. Trump deregulatory actions are leading states to impose new
regulations. State regulation greatly complicates the effort to assess

“soft” deregulatory costs. States like California, disagreeing with federal
deregulatory efforts, have begun developing their own regulations, in
some cases stricter than what the pre-Trump standard was. CAFE
standards, limits on CO2 emissions, WOTUS, and PFAS regulation are
all areas where deregulatory savings are being reduced, eliminated
entirely, or even winding up greater than they were before or otherwise
would have been.
Some of these state-led efforts may be overruled in court based
on claims of federal preemption.208 Such determinations would have
to be made on a case-by-case basis, however. Thus, marginal business
investment will likely be deterred if that investment is contingent
both on the federal deregulatory rule surviving judicial review and
the corresponding state-led regulation being overturned.

fffK==qÜÉ=jÉ~åáåÖ=çÑ=aÉêÉÖìä~íáçå=
We set out to establish whether deregulation has meaningfully
contributed to economic growth, and the answer appears to be no.
Bluntly, the cost savings from President Trump’s deregulatory acts
have been trivial, particularly when compared to other federal interventions in the economy. For example, federal spending increased by
$127 billion from 2017 to 2018.209 Even with the major tax cut at the
end of 2017, federal receipts increased by about $14 billion.210 As discussed earlier, tariffs imposed on China and other major trading
partners likely cost at least $7.8 billion annually, and possibly as
much as $63 billion. The administration has promised $16 billion in
trade aid to farmers, suggesting that the trade war has inflicted at
least that much in costs.211 If the headlines proclaiming $86 billion in
regulatory savings were credible, the deregulatory agenda might
208. Environmental & Energy Law Program Staff, CAFE Standards and the California
Preemption Plan, ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM HARV. L. SCH. (Aug. 24, 2018),

https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/cafe-standards-and-the-california-preemption-plan/.
209. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES tbl1.1,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.
210. Id.
211. Ana Swanson, Trump Gives Farmers $6 Billion in Aide Amid Prolonged China
Trade
War,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
23,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/farm-aid-package.html.
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compensate for trade headwinds. However, $3.3 billion annually
would not meaningfully alter the trajectory of the economy.
While this article is focused on providing a neutral empirical
analysis of President Trump’s deregulation, that analysis raises related questions which merit further discussion and which are difficult to
discuss empirically:
To what extent does this article’s analysis undermine the idea of
deregulation producing economically significant cost savings, even
outside of the context of the Trump administration?
Is the Trump administration pursuing an optimal deregulatory
strategy?
Using lessons learned through the empirical analysis of this article, we can at least make some progress in answering these questions.

A. Significant Deregulatory Savings are Possible, but Not Easily
Achieved.
Deregulation can produce significant cost savings, but is paradoxically less likely to do so if pursued with a monomaniacal focus on
cost-cutting. A simple example helps elucidate the point: if the EPA
rescinded rules against adding tetraethyl lead to gasoline, fuel economy and engine performance would likely increase, saving business
and consumers billions of dollars.212 However, virtually no one advocates for the reintroduction of leaded gasoline. One obvious reason is
that the benefits of lead regulation far outweigh the costs—lead in
the environment can cause trillions of dollars in losses from premature deaths, lowered intelligence, and increased propensity to violence. But, given the focus on regulatory costs and skepticism of benefits exhibited by anti-regulatory commentators, why would the
Trump administration not propose deregulation of gasoline additives?

1. Ignoring benefits triggers stronger reaction from courts and state
governments.
One can better understand the path to lower regulatory costs by
212. See Tim Harford, Why Did We Use Leaded Petrol for So Long?, BBC (Aug. 28,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-40593353.

394

333]

Deregulation Defanged

considering the factors we observed that whittled down the “soft” deregulatory effects of President Trump’s deregulatory efforts. If the
federal government proposed a cessation of lead regulation, state
governments would surely intervene, diluting the cost savings from
the federal government ceasing lead regulation. A multiplicity of lawsuits would likely lead courts to first stay, then overturn the deregulatory rule entirely. The auto and engine manufacturers who might
have benefited from the deregulation would not have the regulatory
certainty necessary to actually profit from the deregulation of lead. In
a simple model of the rulemaking process, we imagine that the EPA
can act in a mostly unconstrained manner to reduce regulatory costs.
However, in reality, federal agencies, states, and courts all have some
share of power. Unilateral action simply does not work, even in the
short-term.
The factors discussed earlier in the article underscore the weakness of the cost-obsessive focus, most notably intervention by the judiciary and state governments. There is ample reason to believe that
a focus solely on costs will lead to deregulatory actions that disproportionately fail in court and within state governments. Courts generally evaluate challenges to regulatory action under the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard of the APA. While formal numerical costbenefit analysis is not required under that standard, failure to consider an important factor is grounds for overturning a rulemaking.213
Entirely ignoring regulatory benefits would clearly be a failure to
consider an important factor.
State governments systematically weaken the value of deregulatory action because of immediate political reality and the economic
consequences of federalism. The political reality is that California is
more pro-regulation than the country as a whole, and its economy is
large enough that most companies cannot afford to ignore the California market. Thus, California has a veto of sorts in many areas of
regulation. The federal government can attempt to preempt state
regulation, but the prospects of success for preemption vary depending on the field.
More broadly, the economics of deregulation are such that companies can only enjoy the benefits to the extent that they are still able
213. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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to follow regulations in the markets in which they want to participate.
For individual firms, the value of federal deregulation is often less
than the value of participating in the California market. That dynamic suggests an increasing gap between federal and state regulatory
goals leads to decreasing deregulatory savings from federal action.

2. Deregulatory “savings” require strategies deeper than simple
reaction.
Courts and state governments mobilize to oppose deregulation
that is directly framed as a partisan rejection of their values. All of the
largest Trump deregulatory actions are rejecting Obama administration initiatives, and almost all of those deregulatory actions are rejecting initiatives from 2015 or later. The Clean Power Plan, redefinition
of WOTUS, new CAFE and CO2 emission standards for vehicles—
the Trump administration is targeting all of them, and in each case
the administration’s efforts are being weakened or undermined entirely by courts or state governments. States have created regional initiatives to lower CO2 emissions in the absence of the Clean Power
Plan;214 the prospects for the WOTUS redefinition in court remain
murky;215 and as we just discussed, California is almost singlehandedly undoing the new CAFE and CO2 emission standards for
vehicles.
If courts and state governments are key obstacles to a deregulatory agenda, a wise deregulatory strategy would decrease the likelihood
of their involvement. Repeal of recent opposition party initiatives increases the likelihood of intervention by courts and state governments. Repeal of recent rules will necessarily be high-profile and divisive, and consequently there will be more lawsuits filed against such
repeals. The repeal effort will likely engender partisan disagreement,
raising the probability that state-level opposition party lawmakers
will act immediately to counteract the action’s effects.
While a full empirical analysis would be necessary to evaluate
when courts and state government interpose themselves in federal
regulation, there are some obvious ways to avoid their intervention.
First, if Congress acts instead of agencies on their own, the main ave214. See "The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative", https://www.rggi.org/.
215. See Pamela King, Wotus lawsuits start long, muddy legal battle, E&E News, Oct.
24, 2019, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061365079.
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nue for judicial review—arbitrary and capricious review—is nullified.
Congressional acts are not subject to arbitrary and capricious review.
Congress can also manifest an intention for federal law to supersede
state law in a particular field, making state intervention much more
difficult. Second, if the administration must act without Congress, it
should target areas outside of immediate public interest. For example,
if the public is focused and aware of rules relating to climate change,
regulatory activity relating to climate change will prompt the public
to pressure state legislators to pass countervailing laws or litigationfocused advocacy groups to file lawsuits. Third, to the extent possible, agencies should present their actions as modifications of previous
rules, not wholesale repeal. That will tend to lower the psychological
salience of the action and reduce confrontation.216
These recommendations may evince cynicism about the regulatory process, but they actually correspond to broad theories of how the
regulatory system should work. Congress’s will should provoke less
partisan reaction than an agency’s because it more closely represents
the will of the people. The further an issue is from immediate public
scrutiny, the more appropriate it is for a technocratic agency to address it. When an agency must act to change an existing regulation,
proceeding incrementally is less likely to create vast disruptions or
new unintended consequences. Thus, good politics and good policy
are fairly well aligned when it comes to regulatory agendas.

3. Potential lessons from flawed studies.
There are a number of flaws in NAM’s $2 trillion annual regulatory costs study, but the kernel of truth within it is that improving
the regulatory process can lead to larger savings than repeal of a discrete set of rules. Recall that the methodology of NAM’s 2014 report
rests on extrapolating a proportional increase in GDP from an increase in reported business satisfaction with the regulatory system.
While the methodology that led to the $2 trillion result was doubtlessly flawed, business satisfaction with the regulatory system was
measured by survey questions relating to regulatory process more
216. Cf. Mark R. Leary, Emotional Responses to Interpersonal Rejection, 17
DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 435, 439 (Dec. 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4734881/ (describing rejection as triggering anger as a way to “prevent,
terminate, or punish specific behaviors that are perceived as an immediate threat.”)
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than substance.217
The failure to address process generally stems from a lack of political will, not a lack of clear areas for improvement. For example,
multiple offices within the same agency often administer the same
program.218 Failure to coordinate federal actions with state and local
governments also leads to multiplication of paperwork and costs for
businesses.219 Cost-benefit analysis standards are weak and vary across
the federal government.220 Businesses frequently complain about a
lack of transparency in the permitting process.221 All of these problems could be solved, whether through legislation, executive order, or
coordinated regulatory action. At the federal level, there have been
many efforts over various administrations to increase regulatory efficiency.222 While these efforts have varied in success, none has fundamentally addressed chokepoints in the process.

B. What is the Objective of the Trump Administration’s
Deregulatory Strategy?
The above analysis suggests that the Trump administration’s de-

217. W. MARK CRAIN AND NICOLE V. CRAIN, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION
TO THE U.S. ECONOMY, MANUFACTURING AND SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT FOR THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS 68 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/

20150323014159/https://www.nam.org/data-and-reports/cost-of-federal-regulations/federalregulation-full-study.pdf.
218. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-285SP, 2019 ANNUAL
REPORT (2019), https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-19-285SP/.
219. See id.
220. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS
REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (Dec. 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41974.pdf (“An OMB report indicated that independent regulatory agencies provided
some information [on] costs and benefits in 76 of the 118 major rules they issued from FY2003
to FY2012. Cabinet departments and other agencies estimated monetary costs and benefits for
some, but not all, of their rules.”).
221. See, e.g., William D. Eggers and Pankaj Kishnani, Compliance Without Tears: Improving the Government-to-Business Experience, DELOITTE (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/industry/public-sector/relationship-betweengovernment-and-business-customer-experience.html (repeatedly emphasizing business complaints about lack of regulatory transparency).
222. See Stuart Shapiro and Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2016), http://www.nyujlpp.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Shapiro-Moran-Regulatory-Reform-Since-the-APA19nyujlpp141.pdf (describing the failure of regulatory reforms such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act).
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regulatory strategy was poorly conceived if the objective was maximizing savings. However, as a concluding note, it is worth discussing
potential structural reasons why the administration has followed its
chosen path. Putting aside for the moment criticisms based on incompetence, the Trump administration has not initiated any significant effort to change the regulatory process.223 The issue is thus not
one of competence, but of strategy. To judge whether the Trump
administration’s strategy is sound, we must consider how we measure
success. This article has demonstrated the strong likelihood that if
the Trump administration is seeking to lower regulatory costs
enough to drive economic growth, it has not succeeded. However,
the deregulatory agenda can serve many functions other than lowering cost. I will review a few possible functions of the current deregulatory agenda, though I stress that the true objective is unknown and
likely a combination of multiple factors.

1. Keeping the Republican Party unified
The importance of the deregulatory agenda may be its signaling
value to wavering Republican elites. As many observers have noted,
President Trump has challenged Republican Party orthodoxy on issues like trade. Because the notion of a deregulatory agenda primarily
dates back to President Reagan in the minds of most Republican
elites, it is comforting for otherwise skeptical Republicans that President Trump seems to pay homage to this part of the Republican platform.
If the intent of the deregulatory strategy is to visibly signal adherence to reducing the role of the federal government, it makes perfect
sense to attempt to repeal high-profile regulations from the Obama
administration. To modern-day Republicans almost twenty years removed from the Clinton administration, Obama-era initiatives constitute the most visible example of regulatory cost, even if they do not
impose particularly massive costs on an economy-wide scale. Subsequent intervention by the judiciary and state governments does not
223. Arguably, the administration’s most significant attempt at process reform is ignoring
co-benefits in environmental rules. While that change impacts multiple rules, it is best understood as an attempt to make specific substantive deregulatory actions easier, especially those
relating to climate change. By its very nature, this change will not affect regulatory costs for
anyone based on process. It can only affect regulatory costs by making particular rules easier to
repeal.
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affect the efficacy of the signal the Trump administration gives to
Republicans when it loudly declares that it is repealing the Clean
Power Plan.

2. Providing an alternative explanation for economic growth
The Trump administration has enjoyed a period of consistent
economic growth, albeit one that does not appear radically different
from growth periods in the Bush or Obama administrations. To
claim credit for that economic growth, the Trump administration
and its supporters must point to some policy change. The tax cuts did
not go into effect until 2018, so the cuts cannot explain the growth.
The other major legislative policy initiative of the Trump administration, healthcare reform, collapsed in 2017. What other administration policy could be credited for the growth? Because deregulatory
benefits are hard to measure, they provide a facially plausible explanation for growth, particularly if partisan estimates place savings dozens of times higher than neutral analyses. The use of deregulation as
a plausible and difficult-to-disprove factor would explain why Republicans do not seem particularly interested in discovering the actual
amount of deregulatory savings, but still cite deregulation to explain
economic growth.

3. Pleasing specific constituencies
The deregulatory initiatives to date have not created economically significant savings on a nationwide scale, but the hard and soft
benefits are often focused among favored constituencies. While repeal of the Clean Power Plan and replacement with the Affordable
Clean Energy rule does not produce major savings, what savings it
does produce are focused among coal producers and coal plant operators. For a variety of sociological reasons outside the purview of this
article, people involved in the coal industry are perceived to be a key
part of President Trump’s base of support in Rust Belt” states.
Even more specifically, while the coal industry as a whole has
continued to shed plants and employment despite President Trump’s
support, specific coal companies have profited from close relationships with regulators within the Trump administration.224 Those
224.
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companies can enjoy significant benefits from deregulation even if
the overall regulatory benefit is low. This theory is further bolstered
by President Trump’s first EPA director, Scott Pruitt, becoming a
lobbyist for an Indiana coal company soon after leaving the EPA.225

4. Ideological/psychological salience of specific regulatory issues
Many of the major regulatory issues taken on by the Trump administration provoke the strongest partisan divide. For example,
President Trump has repeatedly stated he does not believe in climate
change, or believes that it might change back without human intervention. Democrats have complained frequently about the President’s views. Even if the President does not particularly care about
climate change, he may direct his agency heads to repeal climate
change-related regulations simply to spite his opponents.
While this explanation may be simplistic, it helps to explain the
administration’s refusal to act incrementally in virtually any regulatory field despite the obvious vulnerabilities of acting in an all-ornothing fashion. For example, the automobile industry is now in the
awkward position of opposing the administration’s CAFE and CO2
standards because they do not want extreme actions to provoke a Californian backlash.226 Another example: the administration declared
almost all offshore land available for oil and natural gas leases despite
protests from nearly every coastal state, including Republican-leaning
states.227 These actions sound like a one-sentence directive designed
for a press release, not a clever deregulatory plan that could actually
go into effect.

List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/climate/coal-murray-

trump-memo.html.
225. Emily Hopkins, Scott Pruitt Left the EPA Mired in Scandal. Now He is Lobbying
Indiana Lawmakers., INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Apr. 19, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.indystar.com
/story/news/environment/2019/04/18/scott-pruitt-now-lobbyist-indianalegislature/3511759002/.
226. See Robinson Meyer, How the Carmakers Trumped Themselves, ATLANTIC (Jun.
20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/how-the-carmakers-trumpedthemselves/562400/ (statement of the President of Ford) (“We support increasing clean car
standards through 2025 and are not asking for a rollback.”).
227. See Madeleine Carlisle, Trump’s Offshore-Drilling Plan Is Roiling Coastal Elections, ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/trumpsoffshore-drilling-plan-is-roiling-coastal-elections/566726/.
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The overall level of federal regulation has been a focus of Republican politics for decades. However, because Democrats are generally
more interested in individual regulations than overall levels, the actual study of regulations writ large has become one-sided and atrophied. The lax standards of regulatory estimates allow for all manner
of hyperbole, which reinforces the fear of the political right that
regulations are imposing massive costs. That fear leads to broad attempts at deregulation that are weakened by state and judicial intervention. A more accurate understanding of regulatory costs would be
an important first step toward a more coherent, effective regulatory
agenda.
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